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Environmental policy discussions increasingly focus on issues related to
technological change.  This is partly because the environmental consequences of social
activity are frequently affected by the rate and direction of technological change, and
partly because environmental policy interventions can themselves create constraints and
incentives that have significant effects on the path of technological progress.  This paper,
prepared as a chapter draft for the forthcoming Handbook of Environmental Economics
(North-Holland/Elsevier Science), summarizes current thinking on technological change
in the broader economics literature, surveys the growing economic literature on the
interaction between technology and the environment, and explores the normative
implications of these analyses.  We begin with a brief overview of the economics of
technological change, and then examine theory and empirical evidence on invention,
innovation, and diffusion and the related literature on the effects of environmental policy
on the creation of new, environmentally friendly technology.  We conclude with
suggestions for further research on technological change and the environment.Table of Contents
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TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND THE ENVIRONMENT
by
Adam B. Jaffe, Richard G. Newell, and Robert N. Stavins
*
1.  Introduction
In the last decade, discussions of environmental economics and policy have become
increasingly permeated by issues related to technological change.  An understanding of the
process of technological change is important for two broad reasons.  First, the environmental
impact of social and economic activity is profoundly affected by the rate and direction of
technological change.  New technologies may create or facilitate increased pollution, or may
mitigate or replace existing polluting activities.  Further, because many environmental problems
and policy responses thereto are evaluated over time horizons of decades or centuries, the
cumulative impact of technological changes is likely to be large.  Indeed, uncertainty about the
future rate and direction of technological change is often an important sensitivity in “baseline”
forecasts of the severity of environmental problems.  In global climate change modeling, for
example, different assumptions about autonomous improvements in energy efficiency are often
the single largest source of difference among predictions of the cost of achieving given policy
objectives (Weyant 1993; Energy Modeling Forum 1996).
Second, environmental policy interventions themselves create new constraints and incentives
that affect the process of technological change.  These induced effects of environmental policy
on technology may have substantial implications for the normative analysis of policy decisions.
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They may have quantitatively important consequences in the context of cost-benefit or cost-
effectiveness analyses of such policies.  They may also have broader implications for welfare
analyses, because the process of technological change is characterized by externalities and
market failures with important welfare consequences beyond those associated with
environmental issues.
Our goals in this chapter are to summarize for environmental economists current thinking
on technological change in the broader economics literature; to survey the growing literature on
the interaction between technology and the environment; and to explore the normative
implications of these analyses.  This is a large task, inevitably requiring unfortunate but
necessary omissions.  In particular, we confine ourselves to the relationship between technology
and problems of environmental pollution, leaving aside a large literature on technological change
in agriculture and natural resources more broadly.
1  Because of the significant environmental
implications of fossil fuel combustion, we include in our review some of the relevant literature
on technological change and energy use.
2
Section 2 provides a brief overview of the general literature on the economics of
technological change.  It is intended less as a true survey than as a checklist of issues that the
interested reader can use to find entry points into the literature.
3  Section 3 discusses invention
and innovation, including the idea of “induced innovation” whereby environmental policy can
stimulate the creation of new environmentally friendly technology.  Section 4 focuses on issues
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related to technology diffusion.  Section 5 provides concluding observations and suggestions for
future research.
2.  Fundamental Concepts in the Economics of Technological Change
The literature pertaining to the economics of technological change is large and diverse.
Major sub-areas (with references to surveys related to those areas) include:  the theory of
incentives for research and development (Tirole 1988; Reinganum 1989; Geroski 1995); the
measurement of innovative inputs and outputs (Griliches 1984 and Griliches 1998); analysis and
measurement of externalities resulting from the research process (Griliches 1992; Jaffe 1998a);
the measurement and analysis of productivity growth (Jorgenson 1990; Griliches 1998;
Jorgenson and  Stiroh 2000); diffusion of new technology ( Karshenas and  Stoneman 1995;
Geroski 2000); the effect of market structure on innovation (Scherer 1986; Sutton 1998); market
failures related to innovation and appropriate policy responses (Martin and Scott 2000); the
economic effects of publicly funded research (David et al. 2000); the economic effects of the
patent system (Jaffe 2000); and the role of technological change in endogenous macroeconomic
growth (Romer 1994; Grossman and Helpman 1994).  In this section, we present a selective
overview designed to provide entry points into this large literature.
2.1. Schumpeter and the Gale of Creative Destruction
The modern theory of the process of technological change can be traced to the ideas of
Josef Schumpeter (1942), who saw innovation as the hallmark of the modern capitalist system.
Entrepreneurs, enticed by the vision of the temporary market power that a successful new
product or process could offer, continually introduce such products.  They may enjoy excess
profits for some period of time, until they are displaced by subsequent successful innovators, in a
continuing process that Schumpeter called “creative destruction.”4
Schumpeter distinguished three steps or stages in the process by which a new, superior
technology permeates the marketplace.  Invention constitutes the first development of a
scientifically or technically new product or process.
4  Inventions may be patented, though many
are not.  Either way, most inventions never actually develop into an  innovation, which is
accomplished only when the new product or process is commercialized, that is, made available
on the market.
5  A firm can innovate without ever inventing, if it identifies a previously existing
technical idea that was never commercialized, and brings a product or process based on that idea
to market.  The invention and innovation stages are carried out primarily in private firms through
a process that is broadly characterized as “research and development” (R&D).
6  Finally, a
successful innovation gradually comes to be widely available for use in relevant applications
through adoption by firms or individuals, a process labeled diffusion.  The cumulative economic
or environmental impact of new technology results from all three of these stages,
7 which we refer
to collectively as the process of technological change.
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2.2. Production Functions, Productivity Growth, and Biased Technological Change
The measurement of the rate and direction of technological change rests fundamentally
on the concept of the transformation function,
(,,)0 TYIt£ , (1)
where Y represents a vector of outputs, I represents a vector of inputs, and t is time.  Equation (1)
describes a production possibility frontier, that is, a set of combinations of inputs and outputs
that are technically feasible at a point in time.  Technological change is represented by
movement of this frontier that makes it possible over time to use given input vectors to produce
output vectors that were not previously feasible.
In most applications, separability and aggregation assumptions are made that make it
possible to represent the economy’s production technology with a production function,
(,,;) YfKLEt = , (2)
where Y is now a scalar measure of aggregate output (for example, gross domestic product), and
the list of inputs on the right-hand side of the production function can be made arbitrarily long.
For illustrative purposes, we conceive of output as being made from a single composite of capital
goods, K, a single composite of labor inputs, L, and a single composite of environmental inputs,
E (for example, waste assimilation).  Again, technological change means that the relationship
between these inputs and possible output levels changes over time.
Logarithmic differentiation of Equation (2) with respect to time yields
ttLttKttEtt yAlke bbb =+++, (3)
                                                                                                                                                
and the resulting reduced marginal cost causes users to increase utilization, then the emissions reduction associated
with higher efficiency may be partially or totally offset by higher utilization.6
in which lower case letters represent the percentage growth rates of the corresponding upper case
variable; the  b ’s represent the corresponding logarithmic partial derivatives from Equation (2);
and the t indicate that all quantities and parameters may change over time.
8  The term  At
corresponds to “neutral” technological change, in the sense that it represents the rate of growth of
output if the growth rates of all inputs were zero.  But the possibility that the  b ’s can change
over time allows for “biased” technological change, that is, changes over time in  relative
productivity of the various inputs.
Equations (2) and (3) are most easily interpreted in the case of process innovation, in
which firms figure out more efficient ways to make existing products, allowing output to grow at
a rate faster than inputs are growing.  In principle, these equations also apply to product
innovation. Y is a composite or aggregate output measure, in which the distinct outputs of the
economy are each weighted by their relative value, as measured by their market price.  Improved
products will typically sell at a price premium, relative to lower quality products, meaning that
their introduction will increase measured output even if the physical quantity of the new goods
does not exceed the physical quantity of the old goods they replaced.  In practice, however,
product improvement will be included in measured productivity only to the extent that the price
indices used to convert nominal GDP or other nominal output measures to real output measures
are purged of the effects of product innovation.  In general, official price indices and the
corresponding real output measures achieve this objective only to a limited extent.
On its face, Equation (3) says nothing about the source of the productivity improvement
associated with the neutral technological change term, At.   If, however, all inputs and outputs are
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properly measured, and inputs (including R&D) yield only normal investment returns, then all
endogenous contributions to output should be captured by returns to inputs, and there should be
no “residual” difference between the weighted growth rates of inputs and the growth rate of
output. The observation that the residual has been typically positive is therefore interpreted as
evidence of some source of exogenous technological change.
9
There is now a large literature on the measurement and explanation of the productivity
residual.  There are two basic approaches to the measurement of productivity.  The “growth
accounting” approach relies on neoclassical production theory under constant returns to scale for
the proposition that the  b ’s in Equation (3) are equal to the corresponding factor shares, and
thereby calculates the At as an arithmetic residual after share-weighted input growth rates are
subtracted from the growth rate of output (Denison 1979; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2000).
The “econometric” approach estimates the parameters of Equation (3) from time series data and
infers the magnitude of At as an econometric residual after the estimated effects of all measurable
inputs on output have been allowed for (Jorgenson and Griliches 1967; Jorgenson and Stiroh,
2000).  In both of these approaches, much attention has focused on the difficulties of
appropriately measuring both inputs and outputs (Jorgenson and Griliches 1967; Griliches 1994).
This issue can be particularly problematic for the measurement of natural capital stocks, which
can lead to bias in the productivity residual if they are ignored or mismeasured (see Dasgupta
and Mäler (2000) and the chapter on “National Income Accounts and the Environment” in this
volume). A particular focus has been understanding the slowdown in productivity growth in the
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1970s and 1980s relative to the earlier postwar period, including the role played by rising energy
prices in that slowdown (Berndt and Wood 1986, Jorgenson 1984).
In many contexts, it is difficult to distinguish the effects of innovation and diffusion.  We
observe improvements in productivity (or other measures of performance) but do not have the
underlying information necessary to separate such improvements into movements of the
production frontier and movements of existing firms towards the frontier.  A related issue, and
one that is often significant for environment-related technological change, is that innovation can
be undertaken either by the manufacturers or the users of industrial equipment.  In the former
case, the innovation must typically be embodied in new capital goods, and must then diffuse
through the population of users via the purchase of these goods, in order to affect productivity or
environmental performance.  In the latter case, the innovation may take the form of changes in
practices that are implemented with existing equipment.  Alternatively, firms may develop new
equipment for their own use, which they then may or may not undertake to sell to other firms.
The fact that the locus of activity generating environment-related technological change can be
supplying firms, using firms, or both, has important consequences for modeling the interaction of
technological change and environmental policy.
The embodiment of new technology in new capital goods creates an ambiguity regarding
the role played by technology diffusion with respect to Equations (2) and (3).  One interpretation
is that these equations represent “best practice,” that is, what the economy would produce if all
innovations made to date had fully diffused.  In this interpretation, innovation would drive
technological change captured in Equation (3); the issue of diffusion would then arise in the form
of the presence of firms producing at points inside the production possibility frontier.  Frontier
estimation techniques (Aigner and Schmidt 1980) or data envelopment methods (Fare  et al.9
1994) would be needed to measure the extent to which such sub-frontier behavior is occurring.
10
Alternatively, one can assume that the users of older equipment make optimal, informed
decisions regarding when to scrap old machines and purchase newer ones that embody better
technology.  In this formulation, observed movements of the frontier—measured technological
change—comprise the combined impacts of the invention, innovation and diffusion processes.
2.3. Technological Change and Endogenous Economic Growth
In the last two decades there has emerged a large macroeconomic literature that builds on
the above concepts to produce models of overall economic growth based on technological
change (Romer 1990, 1994; Grossman and Helpman 1994; Solow 2000).  In these models, R&D
is an endogenous equilibrium response to Schumpeterian profit incentives.  Spillovers associated
with this R&D generate a form of dynamic increasing returns, which allows an economy
endogenously investing in R&D to grow indefinitely.
11  This stands in contrast to the older
neoclassical growth model, in which  exogenous technological change, in the presence of
decreasing returns to investment in physical capital, typically yields an economy that tends
towards a steady state in which income per capita does not grow.
12
Endogenous growth theory has played an important role in re-introducing technological
change—and the associated policy issues deriving from R&D market failures—into discussions
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11 It is also possible to generate such endogenous growth through human capital investment (Lucas 1988).
12 Thus, in the literature, “endogenous technological change” and “induced technological change” refer to different
concepts, even though the opposite of each is often described by the same phrase, that is, exogenous technological
change.  Endogenous technological change refers to the broad concept that technological change is the result of
activities within the economic system, which are presumed to respond to the economic incentives of the system.
Induced technological change refers to the more specific idea that changes in relative factor prices affect the rate
and direction of innovation.  In practice, papers that use the phrase “endogenous technological change” tend to
focus on aggregate R&D expenditure and neutral technological change.  Papers that used the phrase “induced10
about economic growth.
13  Modeling growth as a process driven by the endogenous creation and
diffusion of new technology ought to have implications for important environmental issues such
as sustainable development and global climate change.  Its policy utility has been limited,
however, by its relative lack of empirical foundation, and by the difficulty of linking the
macroeconomic endogenous growth models to the microeconomic foundations of technological
innovation and diffusion (Caballero and Jaffe 1993; Aghion and Howitt, 1998).  This remains an
important area for future research.
3.  Invention and Innovation
As discussed in the introduction, if the imposition of environmental requirements can
stimulate invention and innovation that reduces the (static) cost of complying with those
requirements, this has profound implications for both the setting of environmental policy goals
and the choice of policy instruments.  Nonetheless, there has been some tendency to treat
technology as a “black box” (Rosenberg 1982). For example, the production
function/productivity growth paradigm described in Section 2 says little about what generates
technological change. But following Schumpeter, there has been a line of theoretical and
empirical analysis that has cast invention and innovation as a purposive economic activity, and
has attempted to discern its determinants and effects.  Milestones in this line of research are:
Schmookler 1966; Mansfield 1968; Rosenberg 1982; Griliches 1984; Nelson and Winter 1982;
and Scherer 1986.
14
                                                                                                                                                
technological change” or “induced innovation” tend to focus on the direction of R&D efforts and biases in
technological change.
13 See, for example, Jones and Williams (1998), and the symposium on “New Growth Theory” in the Winter 1994
issue of the Journal of Economic Perspectives.
14 See also the survey by Thirtle and Ruttan (1987).11
It is useful to identify two major strands of thought regarding the determinants of
innovative activity.  We call these two broad categories of modeling approaches the “induced
innovation” approach and the “evolutionary” approach.
15  We now describe the induced
innovation approach, while the evolutionary approach is discussed in Section 3.4.
3.1. The induced innovation approach
3.1.1.  Neoclassical induced innovation
The recognition that R&D is a profit-motivated investment activity leads to the
hypothesis that the rate and direction of innovation are likely to respond to changes in relative
prices.  Since environmental policy implicitly or explicitly makes environmental inputs more
expensive, the “induced innovation” hypothesis suggests an important pathway for the
interaction of environmental policy and technology, and for the introduction of impacts on
technological change as a criterion for evaluation of different policy instruments.
The induced-innovation hypothesis was first articulated by Sir John Hicks:
“a change in the relative prices of the factors of production is itself a spur to invention,
and to invention of a particular kind — directed to economizing the use of a factor which
has become relatively expensive.” (Hicks 1932, p. 124)
16
Analysis of this hypothesis has a long and somewhat tortured history in economics.  Early
empirical work was largely confined to aggregate data, and focused primarily on questions such
as whether historical cross-country differences in wage levels could explain the location of
development of labor-saving inventions (Thirtle and Ruttan 1987).
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diffusion.  As noted above, however, the analytical distinction between innovation and diffusion is blurred in
practice.
16 Writing before Schumpeter, Hicks does not appear to use the word “invention” in the specific sense used by
Schumpeter and adopted by later authors.  Rather, Hicks uses it in a general sense encompassing both invention
and innovation, as used today.12
Hicks did not link the induced-innovation hypothesis in a formal way to the research
process, or to profit-maximizing R&D decisions by firms.  This link was formalized in the 1960s
by Ahmad (1966) and Kamien and Schwartz (1968), and developed further by  Binswanger
(1974).  Binswanger and Ruttan (1978) summarize this literature.  The general approach is to
postulate a “meta” production function according to which investing in R&D changes the
parameters of a production function such as Equation (2).  Unfortunately, theoretical conclusions
regarding the induced affect of changes in factor prices on the parameters of the production
function are sensitive to the specification of the “meta” production function governing the
research process.
Although formulated in terms of the R&D decisions of firms, this theory is nonetheless
aggregate, because the result of the research process is change in the parameters of the aggregate
production function.  That is, “labor-saving” innovation in these models means a change in the
parameters of Equation  (2) that results in less labor being used.  The model abstracts entirely
from what kinds of new machines or processes might be yielding these changes.  Further,
because of the ambiguity described in Section 2.2 as to whether the production frontier does or
does not encompass technology diffusion, there is really no distinction in these models between
induced innovation and the effect of factor prices on the rate of technology diffusion.
A natural way to move the modeling of induced innovation to the microeconomic level is
to recognize that factor-saving technological change comes about largely through the
introduction of new capital goods that embody different input ratios.  These input ratios can then
be thought of as attributes or characteristics of the capital goods in the sense of Lancaster (1971).
Thirtle and Ruttan (1987) provided a review of the non-environmental literature on induced
innovation.  Much of this work is in the agricultural area in which excellent microdata has long13
provided fertile ground for empirical work on innovation and diffusion.
17  In general, available
empirical analyses confirm that factor price changes are associated with factor-saving
technological change.
3.1.2.  Market failures and policy responses
Within the induced innovation approach, firms undertake an investment activity called
“R&D” with the intention of producing profitable new products and processes.  Decisions
regarding the magnitude and nature of R&D activities are governed by firms’ efforts to
maximize their value, or, equivalently, to maximize the expected discounted present value of
cash flows.  In some applications, the output of R&D is explicitly modeled as “knowledge
capital,” an intangible asset that firms use together with other assets and other inputs to generate
revenues.
18
When viewed as an investment activity, R&D has important characteristics that
distinguish it from investment in equipment or other tangible assets.  First, although the outcome
of any investment is uncertain to some extent, R&D investment appears to be qualitatively
different.  Not only is the variance of the distribution of expected returns much larger than for
other investments, but much or even most of the value may be associated with very low-
probability but very high value outcomes (Scherer et al. 2000).  This skewness in the distribution
of the outcomes of the research process has important implications for modeling firms’ R&D
decision making (Scherer and Harhoff, 2000).  In addition, the asset produced by the R&D
investment process is specialized, sunk and intangible, so that it cannot be mortgaged or used as
                                                
17 More recently, the availability of computerized firm-level data on R&D and patents has led to an increase in
parallel analyses in the industrial sector.
18 See Griliches (1979) for the seminal statement of this research approach.  An example of a recent application
measuring the knowledge capital of firms is Hall et al. (2000).14
collateral.  The combination of great uncertainty and intangible outcomes makes financing of
research through capital market mechanisms much more difficult than for traditional investment.
The difficulty of securing financing for research from outside sources may lead to under-
investment in research, particularly for small firms that have less internally generated cash and/or
less access to financial markets.
In addition to these financing difficulties, research investment differs from physical
investment because the asset produced by the research process — new knowledge about how to
make and do things — is difficult to exclude others from using.  As first noted in the classic
paper by Arrow (1962a), this means that the creator of this asset will typically fail to appropriate
all or perhaps most of the social returns it generates.  Much of this social return will accrue as
“spillovers” to competing firms, to downstream firms that purchase the innovator’s products, or
to consumers  (Griliches 1979, 1992; Jaffe 1986, 1998a).  This “appropriability problem” is
likely to lead to significant  underinvestment by private firms in R&D, relative to the social
optimum (Spence 1984).
19
                                                
19 The recognition that the costs and benefits of R&D for the firm are affected by the appropriability problem and
financing issues has led to a large literature on the effects of market structure on innovation.  In the older literature,
it was argued that both these problems would be overcome more easily by large firms and/or firms operating in
concentrated industries characterized by market power.  From these observations, it was hypothesized that
innovation comes disproportionately from large firms and concentrated industries.  This conjecture is known as the
“Schumpeterian Hypothesis.” After much debate about what the Schumpeterian Hypothesis really means, the
volume of evidence seems to show that:  (1) much innovation comes from large firms in moderately concentrated
industries, if only because much economic activity comes from such firms; (2) truly competitive industries (for
example, construction) perform little R&D; (3) beyond minimal size and concentration, there is little evidence of
any monotonic relationship between innovation intensity and either size or concentration; and (4) innovation and
market structure interact dynamically in a way that is not captured by an alleged causal influence of firm size and
market concentration on innovation. For an extensive survey of this literature, see Cohen and Levin (1989).  More
recently, a large game-theoretic literature related to strategic R&D incentives has emerged (surveyed by
Reinganum 1989).  This literature has two strands.  One views R&D or other innovative activities in a context of
continuous competition in which, for example, marginal R&D investments result in marginal cost reductions or
product improvements (for example, Dasgupta and Stiglitz 1980a; Levin and Reiss 1988; Spence 1984).  The other
R&D theory literature focuses on patent races, where firms compete to be the first to achieve a specific innovation
goal (for example, Dasgupta and Stiglitz 1980b; Reinganum 1982; Fudenberg et al. 1983).15
An important special case of the appropriability problem is created by “general purpose
technologies” (Bresnahan and Trajtenberg, 1995).  GPTs are technologies that find use in many
distinct application sectors within the economy, such as the electric motor, the steam engine, the
internal combustion engine and now, the semiconductor and possibly the Internet.  The
development of such technologies increases the returns to R&D designed to incorporate them
into the different applications sectors; development of such applications in turn increases the
return to improving the GPT.  Because of these dynamic feedback effects,  GPTs may be an
important factor in economic growth (Helpman, 1998).  The dynamic feedback between a GPT
and its applications sectors also creates an important example of “path dependence,” discussed in
Section 4 below.  With respect to the environment, whether the GPTs that drive a particular era
are pollution-intensive or pollution-saving may have profound implications for the long-term
environmental prognosis.
As a profit-motivated activity, R&D investment decisions are governed by the cost of
R&D and its expected return.  Theory and evidence suggest that the most important factors
affecting the optimal level of R&D are the after-tax cost of R&D (Hall and van Reenen 2000),
the size of the market (Schmookler 1966), technological opportunity (Rosenberg 1982), and
appropriability conditions (Jaffe 1988).  Each of these varies intrinsically across time, markets,
and technologies, and also is affected by government policy.  In particular, patents and other
forms of intellectual property are used by firms to overcome the appropriability problem,
although the effect of these institutions on investment in R&D or inventive activity has not been
clearly demonstrated empirically (Jaffe, 2000: Cohen et al. 2000).
As noted above, both the appropriability problem and the possibility of capital market
failures in the financing of R&D lead to a presumption that laissez-faire levels of investment in16
innovation will be too low from a social perspective.  There is, however, an offsetting negative
externality that suggests that private R&D incentives may be too great.  R&D is a fixed cost that
must, in equilibrium, be financed by the stream of quasi-rents it produces.  The entry of another
R&D competitor, or an increase in the R&D investment level of a competitor, reduces the
expected quasi-rents earned by other R&D firms.  This “rent-stealing” effect ( Mankiw and
Whinston 1986) could, as a theoretical matter, lead to over-investment in R&D.  This is
analogous to the over-fishing of an open-access fishery by a competitive fishing industry.
20
The empirical evidence suggests, however, that positive externalities associated with
knowledge spillovers dominate the rent-stealing effect, leading to social rates of return to R&D
substantially in excess of the private rates of return (Griliches 1992).  In practice, virtually all
industrialized countries engage in policies designed to encourage investment in innovation
(Guellec and van Pottelsberghe 2000; Mowery and Rosenberg 1989).  It is difficult to determine
how well these policies do in moving R&D toward optimal levels.  There is some evidence that
social rates of return remain well above private levels (Griliches 1992; Jones and Williams
1998), but there is also evidence that R&D subsidies drive up the wages of scientists enough to
prevent significant increases in real R&D ( Goolsbee 1998).  This implies that the supply of
scientists and engineers is relatively inelastic; whether such inelasticity could hold in the long
run remains unresolved.
Policy can try to increase social investment in R&D by engaging in R&D in the public
(and/or nonprofit) sector, or by trying to reduce the after-tax cost of R&D for private firms.
                                                
20 There is also a dynamic analogue to the tension between spillovers and rent-stealing.  Over time, innovation may
become cumulatively easier because subsequent inventors “stand on the shoulders” of those who came before; or it
may become harder, because the pool of potential inventions is “fished out.”  In the 1980s, there was considerable
interest in the idea that “fishing out” of invention potential may explain the productivity slowdown of the 1970s17
R&D in the public sector and in universities is an important, though declining component of the
overall research effort in the U.S. and other developed nations.
21  The evidence on the
effectiveness of public research is mixed, partly because of the difficulty of measuring the output
of the basic research process (Jaffe 1998b), and partially because of the difficulty of determining
the extent of complementarity or substitutability between public research investment and private
investment (David et al. 2000).  Examples of successful government technology development (as
opposed to research) have been particularly few (Cohen and Noll 1991).  Nonetheless, public
R&D may well play a particularly important role with respect to environment-related science and
technology, since the external social benefits of environmentally benign technology are unlikely
to be fully captured by private innovators.
Government policy affects the after-tax cost of R&D via tax incentives (Hall and Van
Reneen (2000),
22 direct subsidies and grants for research (Klette et al. 2000; Trajtenberg 2000),
and also via educational policies that affect the supply of scientists and engineers (Romer 2000).
Public policies can affect the market for new technologies via direct government purchase,
subsidies for purchase or installation of products incorporating particular technologies,
(Stoneman 1987), and also disincentives against the adoption of competing technologies
(pollution fees, for example). Finally, policies can affect the extent to which firms can
                                                                                                                                                
(Evenson 1991).  But the surge in patenting and productivity growth rates in the 1990s has led to a fading of the
fishing-out idea (Jaffe, 2000).
21 Research performed in government labs, universities and other non-profit institutions is currently about one-fourth
of all research performed in the U.S., versus three-quarters performed in the for-profit sector.  In addition, some of
the research performed by firms is funded by public money; altogether, over one-third of all R&D is funded by
public sources (National Science Board, 1998).  This estimate excludes the implicit public subsidy for private
research represented by the Research and Experimentation Tax Credit.
22 The effect of taxation on R&D incentives is theoretically complex.  On the one hand, any tax on profits derived
from R&D drives a wedge between the before- and after-tax returns and hence discourages R&D investment.  On
the other hand, returns from R&D are taxed much more lightly than returns from investment in equipment and
structures, both because of explicit R&D incentives, and also because R&D can be expensed rather than
amortized.  Thus relative to traditional investment, R&D is strongly tax-preferred.18
successfully appropriate the returns to their research, by establishing the institutional
environment of patent systems, employment relations, and antitrust or other competition
policies.
23
3.1.3.  Empirical evidence on induced innovation in pollution abatment and energy
conservation
The greatest challenge in testing the induced innovation hypothesis specifically with
respect to environmental inducement is the difficulty of measuring the extent or intensity of
inducement across firms or industries (Jaffe, et al. 1995).  Ideally, one would like to look at the
relationship between innovation and the shadow price of pollution or environmental inputs.  In
practice, such shadow prices are not easily observed.  Consequently, one must use proxies for
this shadow price, such as characteristics of environmental regulations, expenditures on pollution
abatement, or prices of polluting inputs (for example, energy).  In the following paragraphs, we
review in turn studies that have used each of these approaches.
There is a large literature on the impact of environmental regulation on productivity and
investment.
24  To the extent that regulation inhibits investment and/or slows productivity growth,
this can be viewed as indirect evidence suggesting that induced innovation effects are either
small or are outweighed by other costs of regulation.  Results of this type seem to be industry
and methodology dependent.  For measuring the characteristics of environmental regulations,
studies have used expert judgements about relative regulatory stringency in different states (Gray
and Shadbegian 1998), number of enforcement actions (Gray and Shadbegian 1995), attainment
                                                
23 The primary explicit non-fiscal mechanism for encouraging innovation in industrialized countries is the patent
system.  Empirical evidence on the impact of patent protection on the rate of innovation is ambiguous.  For a
survey, see Jaffe (2000).
24 See, for example, Gollop and Roberts (1983), Kolstad and Turnovsky (1998) and Yaisawarng and Klein (1994).
This literature is discussed at greater length in the chapter on “Calculating the Costs of Environmental Regulation”
in this volume.19
status with respect to environmental laws and regulations (Greenstone 1998), and specific
regulatory events (Berman and Bui 1998).
25  For example, Berman and Bui (1998) found
significant productivity increases associated with air pollution regulation in the oil refining
industry, but Gray and Shadbegian (1998) found that pollution abatement investment “crowds
out” productive investment almost entirely in the pulp and paper industry.  Greenstone (1998)
found overall that air pollution regulation has a statistically significant but very small impact on
overall costs, implying a small negative productivity impact.
Lanjouw and Mody (1996) showed a strong association between pollution abatement
expenditures and the rate of patenting in related technology fields.  Jaffe and Palmer (1997)
examined the correlation between pollution expenditures by industry and indicators of
innovation more broadly.  They found that there is a significant correlation within industries over
time between the rate of expenditure on pollution abatement and the level of R&D spending.
They did not, however, find evidence of an effect of pollution control expenditure on overall
patenting.
Evidence of inducement has also been sought by examining the response to changing
energy prices.  Newell (1997, Chapter 2) and Newell et al. (1999) examined the extent to which
the energy efficiency of the menu of home appliances available for sale changed in response to
energy prices between 1958 and 1993, using a model of induced innovation as changing
characteristics of capital goods. Hicks formulated the induced innovation hypothesis in terms of
factor prices.  Newell et al. (1999) generalized this concept to include inducement by regulatory
standards, such as labeling requirements that might increase the value of certain product
                                                
25 Of course, there is a parallel problem with respect to measurement of the rate of invention or innovation.  See
Griliches (1990) and Lanjouw and Schankerman (1999).20
characteristics by making consumers more aware of them.  More generally, non-price regulatory
constraints can fit within the inducement framework if they can be modeled as changing the
shadow or implicit price that firms face in emitting pollutants.  In their framework, the existing
technology for making a given type of equipment at a point in time is identified in terms of
vectors of characteristics (including cost of manufacture) that are feasible.  The process of
invention makes it possible to manufacture “models” (characteristics vectors) that were
previously infeasible.  Innovation means the offering for commercial sale of a model that was not
previously offered for sale.  Induced innovation is then represented as movements in the frontier
of feasible models that reduce the cost of energy efficiency in terms of other attributes.
By constructing a series of dynamic simulations, they examined the effects of energy
price changes and efficiency standards on average efficiency of the menu of products over time.
They found that a substantial amount of the improvement was what may be described as
autonomous (that is, associated with the passage of time), but significant amounts of innovation
were also due to changes in energy prices and changes in energy-efficiency standards. They
found that technological change in air conditioners was actually biased against energy efficiency
in the 1960s (when real energy prices were falling), but that this bias was reversed after the two
energy shocks of the 1970s.  In terms of the efficiency of the average model offered, they found
that energy efficiency in 1993 would have been about one-quarter to one-half lower in air
conditioners and gas water heaters, if energy prices had stayed at their 1973 levels, rather than
following their historical path. Most of the response to energy price changes came within less
than five years of those changes.
Popp (2001a and 2001b) looked more broadly at energy prices and energy-related
innovation.  In the first paper, he found that patenting in energy-related fields increases in21
response to increased energy prices, with most of the effect occurring within a few years, and
then fading over time.  Popp attributed this fading to diminishing returns to R&D.  In the second
paper, he attempted to decompose the overall reduction in energy use that is associated with
changing energy prices between the substitution effect—movements along a given production
frontier—and the induced innovation effect—movement of the production frontier itself induced
by the change in energy prices.  Using energy-related patents as a proxy for energy innovation,
he found that approximately one-third of the overall response of energy use to prices is
associated with induced innovation, with the remaining two-thirds associated with factor
substitution.  Because energy patents are likely to measure energy innovation only with
substantial error, one might interpret this result as placing a lower bound on the fraction of the
overall response of energy use to changing prices that is associated with innovation.
3.2. Effects of instrument choice on invention and innovation
The effect of environmental policies on the development and spread of new technologies
may, in the long run, be among the most important determinants of success or failure in
environmental protection (Kneese and  Schultze 1975).
26  It has long been recognized that
alternative types of environmental policy instruments can have significantly different effects on
the rate and direction of technological change (Orr 1976).  Environmental policies, particularly
those with large economic impacts (for example, those intended to address global climate
change) can be designed to foster rather than inhibit technological invention, innovation, and
diffusion (Kempe and Soete 1990).
                                                
26 Whereas we focus in this section of the chapter on the effects of environmental policy instruments on
technological change, it is also the case that exogenous technological change can differentially affect the
performance of alternative environmental policy instruments.  For example, technological change in monitoring
and enforcement, such as improvements in remote-sensing of motor vehicle emissions, could render particular
policy instruments that focus on emissions, rather than abatement equipment, more attractive.22
3.2.1.  Categories of environmental policy instruments and criteria for comparison
For purposes of examining the link between environmental policy instruments and
technological change, policies can be characterized as either command-and-control or market-
based approaches.  Market-based instruments are mechanisms that encourage behavior through
market signals rather than through explicit directives regarding pollution control levels or
methods.  These policy instruments — such as pollution charges, subsidies, tradeable permits,
and some types of information programs — have been described as “harnessing market forces.”
This is because if they are well designed and implemented, they encourage firms (and/or
individuals) to undertake pollution control efforts that are in their own interests and that
collectively meet policy goals.
27
Conventional approaches to regulating the environment are often referred to as
“command-and-control” regulations, since they allow relatively little flexibility in the means of
achieving goals.  Such regulations tend to force firms to take on similar shares of the pollution-
control burden, regardless of the cost.  Command-and-control regulations do this by setting
uniform standards for firms, the most prevalent of which are performance- and technology-based
standards.  A performance standard sets a uniform control target for firms (emissions per unit of
output, for example), while allowing some latitude in how this target is met. Technology-based
standards specify the method, and sometimes the actual equipment, that firms must use to
comply with a particular regulation.
Holding all firms to the same target can be expensive and, in some circumstances,
counterproductive.  While standards may effectively limit emissions of pollutants, they typically
exact relatively high costs in the process, by forcing some firms to resort to unduly expensive
means of controlling pollution. Because the costs of controlling emissions may vary greatly
                                                
27See the chapter on “Experience with Market-Based Instruments for Environmental Protection” in this volume.23
among firms, and even among sources within the same firm,
28 the appropriate technology in one
situation may not be appropriate (cost-effective) in another.
 All of these forms of intervention have the potential for inducing or forcing some
amount of technological change, because by their very nature they induce or require firms to do
things they would not otherwise do.  Performance and technology standards can be explicitly
designed to be "technology forcing," mandating performance levels that are not currently viewed
as technologically feasible or mandating technologies that are not fully developed. One problem
with these approaches, however, is that while regulators can typically assume that some amount
of improvement over existing technology will always be feasible, it is impossible to know how
much.  Standards must either be made  unambitious, or else run the risk of being ultimately
unachievable, leading to great political and economic disruption (Freeman and Haveman 1972).
Technology standards are particularly problematic, since they tend to freeze the
development of technologies that might otherwise result in greater levels of control.  Under
regulations that are targeted at technologies, as opposed to emissions levels, no financial
incentive exists for businesses to exceed control targets, and the adoption of new technologies is
discouraged.  Under a “Best Available Control Technology” (BACT) standard, a business that
adopts a new method of pollution abatement may be “rewarded” by being held to a higher
standard of performance and thereby not benefit financially from its investment, except to the
extent that its competitors have even more difficulty reaching the new standard (Hahn and
Stavins 1991).  On the other hand, if third parties can invent and patent better equipment, they
can — in theory — have a ready market.  Under such conditions, a BACT type of standard can
provide a positive incentive for technology innovation.  Unfortunately, as we note below, there
has been very little theoretical or empirical analysis of such technology-forcing regulations.
                                                
28 Control costs can vary enormously due to a firm’s production design, physical configuration, inputs, age of assets,
and other factors.24
In contrast with such command-and-control regulations, market-based instruments can
provide powerful incentives for companies to adopt cheaper and better pollution-control
technologies.  This is because with market-based instruments, it pays firms to clean up a bit more
if a sufficiently low-cost method (technology or process) of doing so can be identified and
adopted.
In theory, the relative importance of the dynamic effects of alternative policy instruments
on technological change (and hence long-term compliance costs) is greater in the case of those
environmental problems which are of great magnitude (in terms of anticipated abatement costs)
and/or very long time horizon.
29  Hence, the increased attention that is being given by scholars
and by policy makers to the problem of global climate change
30 has greatly increased the
prominence of the issues that are considered in this part of the chapter.
There are two principal ways in which environmental policy instruments can be
compared with regard to their effects on technological change.  First and foremost, scholars have
asked — both with theoretical models and with empirical analyses — the most direct question:
what effects do particular instruments have on the rate and direction of relevant technological
change?  In keeping with the Schumpeterian trichotomy identified above, such investigations can
be carried out with reference to the pace of invention, innovation, or diffusion of new
technologies.
It is also possible to ask whether environmental policies encourage efficient rates (and
directions) of technological change, or more broadly, whether such policies result in overall
economic efficiency (that is, whether the efficient degree of environmental protection is
achieved).  This second principal mode for comparison is linked more directly with criteria
                                                
29 Parry et al. (2000) showed that the importance of the welfare gains from cost-reducing technological change
relative to the welfare gains from optimal pollution control using existing technology tends to be higher when
marginal benefits are flatter, marginal costs are steeper (and optimal abatement is lower), the discount rate is
lower, the rate of technological change is faster, and research costs are lower.
30See the chapter on “The Economics of Climate Policy” in this volume.  For particular attention to the links
between technological change and global climate policy, see:  Jaffe et al. (1999).25
associated with welfare economics, but such comparisons have been made much less frequently
than have direct assessments of technology effects.  Within the limits of the existing literature,
we consider both sets of  criteria.
31
Most of the work in the economics literature on the dynamic effects of environmental
policy instruments on technological change has been theoretical, rather than empirical, and so we
consider the theoretical literature first.
3.2.2.  Theoretical Analyses
Although, as we suggested above, decisions about technology commercialization are
partly a demand-side function of anticipated sales (adoption), the relevant literature comparing
the effects of alternative environmental policy instruments has given greater attention to the
supply side, focusing on incentives for firm-level decisions to incur R&D costs in the face of
uncertain outcomes.
32  Such R&D can be either inventive or innovative, but the theoretical
literature in this area makes no particular distinction.
The earliest work that is directly relevant was by Magat (1978), who compared effluent
taxes and CAC standards using an innovation possibilities frontier (IPF) model of induced
innovation, where research can be used to augment capital or labor in a standard production
function.  He compared the output rate, effluent rate, output-effluent ratio, and bias (in terms of
labor or capital augmenting technical change), but produced ambiguous results.  Subsequently,
Magat (1979) compared taxes, subsidies, permits, effluent standards, and technology standards,
and showed that all but technology standards would induce innovation biased toward emissions
reduction.
33  In Magat’s model, if taxes and permits are set so that they lead to the same reduction
                                                
31 Enforceability of environmental regulations is another criteria for policy choice that it is rarely emphasized in the
technology literature.  See Macauley and Brennan (1998) for an evaluation of the potential role of remote sensing
technology in the enforcement of environmental regulations.
32 See Kemp (1997) for an overview of theoretical models of technology innovation.
33Technology standards provided no incentives for innovation whatsoever.26
in emissions as an effluent standard at all points in time, then the three instruments provide the
same incentives to innovate.
A considerable amount of theoretical work followed in the 1980’s.  Although much of
that work characterized its topic as the effects of alternative policy instruments on technology
innovation, the focus was in fact on effects of policy on technology diffusion.  Hence, we defer
consideration of those studies to Section 4.3.1 of this chapter.
Taking a somewhat broader view than most economic studies, Carraro and Siniscalco
(1994) suggested that environmental policy instruments should be viewed jointly with traditional
industrial policy instruments in determining the optimal way to attain a given degree of pollution
abatement.  They showed that innovation subsidies can be used to attain the same environmental
target, but without the output reductions that result from pollution taxes. Laffont and Tirole
(1996a) examined how a tradeable permit system could — in theory — be modified to achieve
desired incentive effects for technological change.  They demonstrated that although spot
markets for permits cannot induce the socially optimal degree of innovation, futures markets can
improve the situation (Laffont and Tirole 1996a).
34
Cadot and Sinclair-Desgagne (1996) posed the following question:  if a potentially
regulated industry has private information on the costs of technological advances in pollution
control (frequently a reasonable assumption), then since the industry has an incentive to claim
that such technologies are prohibitively expensive (even if that is not the case), can the
government somehow design an incentive scheme that will avoid the problems of this
information asymmetry?  The authors developed a solution to this game-theoretic problem.  Not
surprisingly, the scheme involves government issued threats of regulation (which diminish over
time as the firm completes stages of technology development).
                                                
34In a subsequent analysis, Laffont and Tirole (1996b) examined the government’s ability to influence the degree of
innovative activity by setting the number of permits (and permit prices) in various ways in a dynamic setting.27
It was only recently that theoretical work followed up on  Magat’s attempt in the late
1970’s to rank policy instruments according to their innovation-stimulating effects.  Fischer et al.
(1998) found that an unambiguous ranking of policy instruments was not possible.  Rather, the
ranking of policy instruments was shown by the authors to depend on the innovator’s ability to
appropriate spillover benefits of new technologies to other firms, the costs of innovation,
environmental benefit functions, and the number of firms producing emissions.
The basic model consists of three stages.  First, an innovating firm decides how much to
invest in R&D by setting its marginal cost of innovation equal to the expected marginal benefits.
Second, polluting firms decide whether or not to adopt the new technology, use an (inferior)
imitation of it, or do nothing.  Finally, firms minimize pollution control expenditures by setting
their marginal costs equal to the price of pollution.  Policy instruments affect the innovation
incentives primarily through three effects: (1) an abatement cost affect, reflecting the extent to
which innovation reduces the costs of pollution control; (2) an imitation effect, which weakens
innovation incentives due to imperfect appropriability; and (3) an emissions payment effect,
which can weaken incentives if innovation reduces firms’ payments for residual emissions.
There is some variation in this pattern depending on the instrument, as shown in Table 1, which
summarizes the direction of the three effects under three alternative policy instruments.  The
ranking of instruments depends on the relative strength of these effects.
In an analysis that is quite similar in its results to the study by Fischer et al. (1998), Ulph
(1998) compared the effects of pollution taxes and command-and-control standards, and found
that increases in the stringency of the standard or tax had ambiguous effects on the level of R&D,
because environmental regulations have two competing effects:  a direct effect of increasing
costs, which increases the incentives to invest in R&D in order to develop cost-saving pollution-
abatement methods; and an indirect effect of reducing product output, which reduces the28
incentive to engage in R&D.
35  Carraro and Soubeyran (1996) compared an emission tax and an
R&D subsidy, and found that an R&D subsidy is desirable if the output contractions induced by
the tax are small or if the government finds output contractions undesirable for other reasons.
Addressing the same trade-off, Katsoulacos and Xepapadeas (1996) found that a simultaneous
tax on pollution emissions and subsidy to environmental R&D may be better suited to
overcoming the joint market failure (negative externality from pollution and positive externality
or spillover effects of R&D).
36
Table 1:  Theoretical Determinants of the Incentives for Innovation
(Fischer et al. 1998)
Determinant Emissions Tax Freely-Allocated
Tradeable Permits
Auctioned
Tradeable Permits
Abatement Cost Effect (+) (+) (+)
Imitation Effect (-) (-) (-)
Emissions Payment Effect None None (+)
Finally, Montero (2000) compared instruments under non-competitive circumstances, and
found that the results are less clear than when perfect competition is assumed.  He modeled a
two-firm oligopoly facing environmental regulation in the form of emissions standards, freely-
allocated permits, auctioned permits, and taxes.  Firms can invest in R&D to lower their marginal
abatement costs, and they can also benefit from spillover effects from the other firm’s R&D
efforts.  In choosing whether and how much to invest in R&D in order to maximize profits, a
                                                
35In addition, Ulph (1998) examined a situation where two firms produce identical products with two characteristics.
If both firms innovate on the same characteristic, price competition will eliminate any gains from R&D; but
consumer pressure can affect the direction of R&D by influencing the characteristic that firms focus on improving.
See also:  Ulph and Ulph (1996).
36 See, also, Conrad (2000).29
firm must consider two effects of its investment choice:  (1) the increase in profits due to a
decrease in its abatement costs (less the R&D cost); and (2) the decrease in profits due to
changes in the other firm’s output, as a result of spillover from the first firm’s R&D.  The result
is that standards and taxes yield higher incentives for R&D when the market is characterized by
Cournot competition, but the opposite holds when the market is characterized by Bertrand
competition.
3.2.3.  Empirical Analyses
There has been exceptionally little empirical analysis of the effects of alternative policy
instruments on technology innovation in pollution abatement, principally because of the paucity
of available data.  One study by Bellas (1998) carried out a statistical analysis of the costs of flue
gas desulfurization (scrubbing) installed at coal-fired power plants in the United States under the
new-source performance standards of the 1970 and 1977 Clean Air Acts.  Bellas failed to find
any evidence of effects of scrubber vintage on cost, suggesting little technological change had
taken place under this regulatory regime.
 Although there has been very little analysis in the context of pollution-abatement
technologies, there is a more extensive literature on the effects of alternative policy instruments
on the innovation of energy-efficiency technologies, because data have been available.  As
described in Section 3.1.3, above, the innovation process can be thought of as affecting
improvements in the characteristics of products on the market, and the process can be framed as
the shifting inward over time of a frontier representing the tradeoffs between different product
characteristics for the range of models available on the market.  If one axis is the cost of the
product and another axis is the energy flow associated with a product, that is, its energy intensity,
then innovation is represented by inward shifts of the curve — greater energy efficiency at the30
same cost, or lower cost for given energy efficiency.  With this approach, Newell, et. al (1999)
assessed the effects of changes in energy prices and in energy-efficiency standards in stimulating
innovation.  Energy price changes induced both commercialization of new models and
elimination of old models.  Regulations, however, worked largely through energy-inefficient
models being dropped, since that is the intended effect of the energy-efficiency standards
(models below a certain energy efficiency level may not be offered for sale).
A closely related approach to investigating the same phenomena is that of hedonic price
functions.  One hedonic study examined the effects of public policies in the context of home
appliances.  Greening  et al. (1997) estimated the impacts of the 1990 and 1993 national
efficiency standards on the quality-adjusted price of household refrigerator/freezer units.  They
found that quality-adjusted prices fell after the implementation of the energy efficiency
standards, but such quality-adjusted price decreases are consistent with historical trends in
refrigerator/freezer prices.  Hence, one cannot rule out the possibility that the imposition of
efficiency standards slowed the rate of quality-adjusted price decline.
Given the attention paid to automobile fuel economy over the past two decades, it is not
surprising that several hedonic studies of automobiles have addressed or focused on energy-
efficiency, including Ohta and Griliches (1976) and Goodman (1983).  Atkinson and Halvorsen
(1984) found that the fuel efficiency of the new car fleet responds more than proportionally to
changes in expected fuel prices.  Using an analogue to the hedonic price technique, Wilcox
(1984) constructed a quality-adjusted measure of automobile fuel economy over the period
1952–1980, finding that it was positively related to oil prices.  Ohta and Griliches (1986) found
that gasoline price changes over the period 1970–1981 could alone explain much of the observed
change in related automobile characteristics.31
Greene (1990) used data on fuel prices and fuel economy of automobiles from 1978 to
1989 to test the relative effectiveness of Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) Standards
and gasoline prices in increasing fuel economy.  He found that the big three U.S. firms faced a
binding CAFE constraint, and for these firms compliance with CAFE standards had roughly
twice the impact on fuel economy as did fuel prices.  Japanese firms, however, did not face a
binding CAFE constraint, and fuel prices had only a small effect. Luxury European manufactures
seemed to base their fuel efficiency largely on market demand and often exceeded CAFE
requirements.  For these firms, neither the standards nor prices seemed to have much effects.
More recently, Pakes, et. al (1993) investigated the effects of gasoline prices on the fuel
economy of motor vehicles offered for sale, and found that the observed increase in miles per
gallon (mpg) from 1977 onward was largely due to the consequent change in the mix of vehicles
on the market.  Fewer low-mpg cars were marketed, and more high-mpg cars were marketed.
Subsequently, Berry et al. (1996) combined plant-level cost data for the automobile industry and
information on the characteristics of models that were produced at each plant to estimate a
hedonic cost function — the supply-side component of the hedonic price function — finding that
quality-adjusted costs generally  increased over the period 1972–1982, thus coinciding with
rising gasoline prices and emission standards.
Finally, Goldberg (1998) combined a demand-side model of discrete vehicle choice and
utilization with a supply-side model of oligopoly and product differentiation to estimate the
effects of CAFE standards on the fuel economy of the new car fleet.  She found that automobile
fuel operating costs have had a significant effect, although a gasoline tax of a magnitude that
could match the effect of CAFE on fuel economy would have to be very large.32
3.3. Induced innovation and optimal environmental policy
Though the magnitude of induced innovation effects remains uncertain, a few researchers
have begun to explore the consequences of induced innovation for environmental policy.
Section 3.2, above, addressed the important question of how considerations related to induced
innovation affect the normative choice among different policy instruments.  In this section, we
consider the larger question of whether the possibility of induced innovation ought to change
environmental policy targets, or the pace at which we seek to achieve them.
Intuitively, it seems logical that if environmental policy intervention induces innovation,
this in some sense reduces the social cost of environmental intervention, suggesting that the
optimal policy is more stringent than it would be if there were no induced innovation.  This
intuition contains an element of truth, but a number of complexities arise.  First, one has to be
careful what is meant by “reducing the cost of intervention.”  As shown by Goulder and
Schneider (1999), if the policy intervention induces a reduction in the marginal cost of
abatement, then any given policy target (for example, a particular aggregate emission rate or a
particular ambient concentration) will be achieved at lower cost than it would without induced
innovation.  On the other hand, the lower marginal abatement cost schedule arising from induced
innovation makes it socially optimal to achieve a greater level of pollution abatement.  For a flat
marginal social benefit function evaluated at the social optimum, or for any emission tax, this
results in greater total expenditure on abatement even as the marginal abatement cost falls.
Another important issue is the general equilibrium effect of induced environmental
innovation on innovation elsewhere in the economy (Schmalensee 1994).  If inducement
operates through increased R&D expenditure, then an issue arises as to the elasticity of supply of
R&D inputs.  To the extent that this supply is inelastic, then any induced innovation must come
at the expense of other forms of innovation, creating an opportunity cost that may negate the33
“innovation offsets” observed in the regulated portion of the economy.
37  The general equilibrium
consequences of these effects for welfare analysis depend on the extent of R&D spillovers or
other market failures, and the magnitude of these distortions in the regulated firms or sectors
relative to the rest of the economy (Goulder and Schneider 1999).
Goulder and Mathai (2000) looked at optimal carbon abatement in a dynamic setting,
considering not only the optimal overall amount of abatement but also its timing.
38  In addition to
R&D-induced innovation, they considered (in a separate model) reductions in abatement costs
that come about via learning-by-doing.  In the R&D model, there are two effects of induced
innovation on optimal abatement:  it reduces marginal abatement costs, which increases the
optimal amount of abatement.  But it also increases the cost of abatement today relative to the
future, because of lower abatement costs in the future.  The combination of these effects implies
that with R&D-induced innovation, optimal abatement is lower in early years and higher in later
years than it would otherwise be. In the learning-by-doing model, there is a third effect:
abatement today lowers the cost of abatement in the future.  This reinforces the tendency for
cumulative optimal abatement to be higher in the presence of induced innovation, but makes the
effect on optimal near-term abatement ambiguous.
Goulder and Mathai also considered the impact of innovation on the optimal tax rate.
One might suppose that the potential for induced technological change justifies a higher
environmental tax rate (or higher time-profile for an environmental tax), since in this setting
environmental taxes have a dual role:  discouraging emissions and triggering new technologies.
                                                
37 Goolsbee (1998) provided evidence that the supply of R&D inputs (scientists and engineers) is relatively inelastic
in the short run.  It seems less likely that this supply is inelastic in the long run.  See Romer (2000).
38 On the role of induced technological change in climate change modeling, see also Wigley et al. (1996), Ha-Duong
et al. (1997), and Grubb (1997).34
Goulder and  Mathai showed, however, that under typical conditions (a downward-sloping
marginal damages curve) the presence of induced innovation implies a lower time-profile for the
optimal environmental tax.  The reason is that with induced innovation, a lower tax is all that is
needed to achieve the desired abatement, even when the desired extent of abatement is higher.
Nordhaus (2000) introduced induced technological change into the “DICE” model of
global climate change and associated economic activities.  To calibrate the model, he needed
parametric estimates of the private and social returns to fossil-fuel-related R&D.  Using the
existing R&D intensity of the fossil sector to derive these parameters, he found that the impact of
induced innovation is modest.  Essentially, the existing share of R&D investment in this sector is
so small that even with large social returns the overall impact is modest.  Indeed, comparing a
model with induced innovation (but no factor substitution) with a model that has factor
substitution but no induced innovation, he concluded that induced innovation has less effect than
factor substitution on optimal emissions levels.
Overall, there is considerable ambiguity regarding the importance of induced innovation
for the optimal stringency of environmental policy.  Partly, this is because predictions depend on
the magnitudes of parameters that are hard to measure.  But, more fundamentally, if
environmental policy affects the innovation process, and the innovation process is itself
characterized by market failure, then this is a classic problem of the “second best.”  We know
that robust results are generally hard to come by with respect to such problems.  It will typically
make a big difference whether we imagine optimizing R&D policy first, and then environmental
policy, or vice versa, or if we imagine simultaneous optimization in both realms, or if we assume
that we are designing optimal environmental policy taking non-optimal R&D policy as given.35
Theory may be able to indicate the considerations that come into play, but is unlikely to provide
robust prescriptions for policy.
3.4. The evolutionary approach to innovation
While viewing R&D as a profit-motivated investment activity comes naturally to most
economists, the large uncertainties surrounding the outcomes of R&D investments make it very
difficult for firms to make optimizing R&D decisions.  Accordingly, Nelson and Winter (1982)
used Herbert Simon’s idea of boundedly rational firms that engage in “satisficing” rather than
optimizing behavior (Simon 1947) to build an alternative model of the R&D process.  In this
“evolutionary” model, firms use “rules of thumb” and “routines” to determine how much to
invest in R&D, and how to search for new technologies.  The empirical predictions of this model
depend on the nature of the rules of thumb that firms actually use (Nelson and Winter 1982;
Winter et al 2000).
Because firms are not optimizing, a logical consequence of the evolutionary model is that
it cannot be presumed that the imposition of a new external constraint (for example, a new
environmental rule) necessarily reduces profits.  There is at least the theoretical possibility that
the imposition of such a constraint could be an event that forces a satisficing firm to rethink its
strategy, with the possible outcome being the discovery of a new way of operating that is
actually more profitable for the firm.  This possibility of environmental regulation leading to a
“win-win” outcome in which pollution is reduced and profits increased is discussed below.
3.4.1.  Porter’s “win-win” hypothesis
The evolutionary approach replaces optimizing firms with satisficing firms, and thereby
admits greater scope for a variety of consequences when the firm’s environment is modified.
Satisficing firms may miss opportunities for increased profits simply because they don’t look36
very hard for such opportunities as long as things are going reasonably well.  An external shock
such as a new environmental constraint can therefore constitute a stimulus to new search,
possibly leading to discovery of previously undetected profit opportunities.  This observation
forms the basis for the normative observation that environmental regulation may not be as costly
as we expect, because the imposition of the new constraint may lead to the discovery of new
ways of doing things.  In the limit, these new ways of doing things might actually be more
profitable than the old ways, leading to an asserted “win-win” outcome.
39
In general, advocates of the “win-win” view of the consequences of environmental
regulation seem unaware of the connection between their argument and the evolutionary school
of technological change.
40  But the ideas are similar:
It is sometimes argued that companies must, by the very notion of profit seeking, be
pursuing all profitable innovation…In this view, if complying with environmental
regulation can be profitable, in the sense that a company can more than offset the cost of
compliance, then why is such regulation necessary?
The possibility that regulation might act as a spur to [profitable] innovation arises
because the world does not fit the Panglossian belief that firms always make optimal
choices…[T]he actual process of dynamic competition is characterized by changing
technological opportunities coupled with highly incomplete information, organizational
inertia and control problems reflecting the difficulty of aligning individual, group and
corporate incentives. Companies have numerous avenues for technological improvement,
and limited attention. (Porter and van der Linde 1995, pp. 98-99)
Porter and other “win-win” theorists argued that in this non-optimizing world, regulation
may lead to “innovation offsets” that “can not only lower the net cost of meeting environmental
                                                
39 Another related idea is that of “X-inefficiency” (Leibenstein, 1966).
40 Neither Simon (1947) nor Nelson and Winter (1982) appear in the references of Porter and van der Linde (1995).
Interestingly, Nelson and Winter themselves anticipated the connection.  In their 1982 book, they say “In a regime
in which technical advance is occurring and organizational structure is evolving in response to changing patterns
of demand and supply, new nonmarket interactions that are not contained adequately by prevailing laws and
policies are almost certain to appear, and old ones may disappear…The canonical ‘externality’ problem of
evolutionary theory is the generation by new technologies of benefits and costs that old institutional structures
ignore.” (page 368)  See also Kemp and Soete (1990).37
regulations, but can even lead to absolute advantages over firms in foreign countries not subject
to similar regulations” (Porter and van der Linde 1995, p. 98).  Of course, the fact that firms
engage in non-optimizing behavior creates a  possibility for profit improvements, without
suggesting that such improvements would be the norm, would be systematic, or even likely.  But
win-win theorists propose several reasons why innovation offsets are likely to be common.
First, they argue that regulation provides a signal to companies about likely resource
inefficiencies and potential technological improvements; that pollution is, by its very nature,
indicative of resources being wasted, or at least not fully utilized.  Regulation focuses attention
on pollution, and such attention is likely to lead to the saving of resources, which will often
lower costs.  Second, regulation provides or requires the generation of information; since
information is a public good it may be underprovided without such incentives.  Third, regulation
reduces uncertainty about the payoffs to investments in environmental innovation.  There may be
potential investments that are believed to be profitable in an expected value sense, and also
deliver environmental benefits, but which are highly risky in the absence of regulation that
ensures that the environmental benefits are also privately valuable.  Regulation, in effect,
provides “insurance” against the risk of investing in new technology, part of whose benefit
cannot be internalized.  Fourth, new technology that is initially more costly may produce long-
run competitive advantage, because of learning-by-doing or other “first-mover” advantages, if
other countries eventually impose similarly strict standards.  Finally, regulation simply creates
pressure.  Such pressure plays an important role in the innovation process, “to overcome inertia,
foster creative thinking and mitigate agency problems” (Porter and van der Linde 1995, p. 100).
Porter and van der Linde (1995) provided numerous case studies of particular firms who
developed or adopted new technology in response to regulation, and appear to have benefited as38
a result.  It should be emphasized, however, that win-win theorists do not claim that all
environmental regulations generate significant innovation offsets.  Indeed, they emphasize that
regulation must be properly designed in order to maximize the chances for encouraging
innovation. Quantitative evidence is limited.  Boyd and McClelland (1999) and Boyd and Pang
(2000) employ data envelopment analysis to evaluate the potential at paper and glass plants for
“win-win” improvements that increase productivity and reduce energy use or pollution.  They
find that the paper industry could reduce inputs and pollution by 2-8% without reducing
productivity.
Generally, economists have been skeptical of the win-win theory (Palmer et al. 1995;
Oates et al. 1993).    From a theoretical perspective, it is possible to model apparently inefficient
firm behavior as the (second-best) efficient outcome of imperfect information and divergent
incentives among managers or between owners and managers in a principal/agent framework.
41
From this perspective, the apparent inefficiency does not have normative implications.  Since
firms are doing the best they can given their information environment, it is unlikely that the
additional constraints represented by environmental policy interventions would be beneficial.
On a more concrete level, it is not clear that pollution generally signals “waste”; most
physical and biological processes have by-products of some sort, and whether the extent of such
by-products is “wasteful” or not is inherently a question of prices and costs.  More generally,
firms’ rationality is surely bounded, but that does not mean that unexploited profit opportunities
are frequent.  Palmer et al. (1995) surveyed firms affected by regulation—including those cited
by Porter and van der Linde as success stories — and found that most firms say that the net cost
to them of regulation is, in fact, positive.
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For regulation to have important informational effects, the government must have better
information than firms have about the nature of environmental problems and their potential
solutions.  This seems questionable.  Of course, the government may have better information
about which environmental problems  it considers most important, but it is not clear how
conveying this type of information would produce win-win outcomes.  As to overcoming inertia,
most firms in today’s world feel a lot of pressure, so it seems unlikely that the additional pressure
of regulation is going to have beneficial stimulating effects on innovation.  Finally, while it
seems likely that environmental regulation will stimulate the innovation and diffusion of
technologies that facilitate compliance, creation and adoption of new technology will typically
require real resources, and have significant opportunity costs.  The observation that the new
technology is cost-saving on a forward-looking basis is not sufficient to conclude that the firm
was made better off by being induced to develop and/or adopt the new technology.
Overall, the evidence on induced innovation and the win-win hypothesis seems to be a
case of a “partially full glass” that analysts see as mostly full or mostly empty, depending on
their perspective.  This balance is summarized in Table 2.40
Table 2
Overview of Conclusions on Induced Innovation and the “Win-win” Hypothesis
Areas of Agreement
Historical evidence indicates that a significant but not predominant fraction of innovation in the energy and
environment area is induced.
Environmental regulation is likely to stimulate innovation and technology adoption that will facilitate environmental
compliance.
Much existing environmental regulation uses inflexible mechanisms likely to stifle innovation; “incentive-based”
mechanisms are likely to be more conducive to innovation.
Firms are boundedly rational so that external constraints can sometimes stimulate innovation that will leave the firm
better off.
First-mover advantages may result from domestic regulation that correctly anticipates world-wide trends.
Areas of Disagreement
Win-Win Theory Neoclassical Economics
Widespread case-study evidence indicates significant
“innovation offsets” are common.
Case studies are highly selective.  Firms believe
regulation is costly.
Innovation in response to regulation is evidence of
offsets that significantly reduce or eliminate the cost of
regulation.
When cost-reducing innovation occurs, the opportunity
cost of R&D and management effort makes a true “win-
win” outcome unlikely.
Pollution is evidence of waste, suggesting why cost-
reducing innovation in response to regulation might be
the norm.
Costs are costs; even if firms are not at the frontier, side-
effects of pollution reduction could just as easily be bad
as good.
Existing productivity or cost studies do not capture
innovation offsets.
Existing productivity and cost studies suggest that
innovation offsets have been very small.
There is much evidence of innovation offsets even
though existing regulations are badly designed.  This
suggests that offsets from good regulation would be
large.
Since there is agreement that bad regulations stifle
innovation, the apparent beneficial effects of existing
regulation only show that case studies can be very
misleading.41
4.  Diffusion
4.1. Microeconomics of Diffusion
From the mechanical reaper of the nineteenth century (David 1966), through hybrid corn
seed (Griliches 1957), steel furnaces ( Oster 1982), optical scanners (Levin  et al. 1987) and
industrial robots (Mansfield 1989), research has consistently shown that the diffusion of new,
economically superior technologies is a gradual process.
42  Typically, the fraction of potential
users that has adopted a new technology follows a sigmoid or “S-shaped” path over time, rising
only slowly at first, then entering a period of very rapid growth, followed by a slowdown in
growth as the technology reaches maturity and most potential adopters have switched (Geroski
2000).
The explanation for the apparent slowness of the technology diffusion process has been a
subject of research in a variety of disciplines.  Two main forces have been emphasized.  First,
potential technology adopters are heterogeneous, so that a technology that is generally superior
will not be equally superior for all potential users, and may remain inferior to existing
technology for some users for an extended period of time after its introduction.  Second,
adopting a new technology is a risky undertaking, requiring considerable information, both about
the generic attributes of the new technology and about the details of its use in the particular
application being considered.  It takes time for information to diffuse sufficiently, and the
diffusion of the technology is limited by this process of diffusion of information.
                                                
42 See, also, Kemp (1997) for an overview of theoretical models of technology diffusion.42
The two main models of the diffusion process each emphasize one of these two aspects of
the process.
43  The probit or rank model, first articulated in an unpublished paper by Paul David
(1969), posits that potential adopters are characterized by a distribution of value or returns
associated with the new technology.
44  Because adoption is costly, at any moment in time there is
a threshold point on this distribution, such that potential users with values at or above this
threshold will want to adopt, and users for whom the value of the new technology is below this
threshold will not want to adopt.  Because the new technology will typically get cheaper and
better as time passes after its initial introduction, this threshold will gradually move to the right,
and eventually sweep out the entire distribution.  If the distribution of underlying values is
normal (or another single-peaked distribution with similar shape), this gradual movement of the
threshold across the distribution will produce the typical S-shaped diffusion curve.
The other widely-used model is called the epidemic model (Griliches 1957; Stoneman
1983).  The epidemic model presumes that the primary factor limiting diffusion is information,
and that the most important source of information about a new technology is people or firms who
have tried it.  Thus technology spreads like a disease, with the instigation of adoption being
contact between the “infected” population (people who have already adopted) and the uninfected
population.  Denoting the fraction of the potential using population that has adopted as f, this
leads to the differential equation  (1)
df
ff
dt
b =- .  Solution of this equation yields a logistic
function, which has the characteristic S-shape.  The parameter  b  captures the “contagiousness”
                                                
43 For empirical examples that integrate the two models, see Trajtenberg (1990) and Kerr and Newell (2000).
44 This has sometimes been called the rank model since potential adopters can be ranked in terms of their potential
benefits from adoption (Karshenas and Stoneman 1995).43
of the disease, presumably related to the cost of the new technology and the degree of its
superiority over the technology it replaces (Griliches 1957).
45
The probit model emphasizes adoption as the result of value-maximizing decisions by
heterogeneous adopters.  As such, at least in its basic form, it does not suggest that the slow
diffusion of new technology is anything but optimal.  In contrast, in the epidemic model each
adopter generates a positive externality by transferring information to other potential adopters.
This suggests that laissez-faire adoption rates may indeed be socially suboptimal.  We return to
this issue in Sections 4.2.2 below.
Finally, we note an important issue of feedback from the diffusion process to the earlier
stages of invention and innovation.  The rate at which a technology diffuses determines in large
part the rate at which its production volume grows.  And as stated earlier, market size tends to be
an important determinant of R&D effort and innovative activity, so that growing use increases
the incentive for R&D to improve the product. Furthermore, if the production process is
characterized by learning by doing, then quality may rise and production costs fall as production
experience is accumulated.  This possibility creates an additional source of positive externality
associated with technology adoption, and may introduce dynamic increasing returns to scale for
individual technologies.  This issue is also discussed below in Section 4.1.1.
In the literature unrelated to environmental technology, both theory and empirical
evidence are clear that technology diffusion rates depend on the strength of economic incentives
for technology adoption.  Both of the models discussed above predict that the present value of
                                                
45 Both the probit and epidemic models typically  focus on the fraction of the population that had adopted at a point
in time.  If one has individual-level data on adopters, one can take as the dependent variable the individual time
until adoption.  This leads to a duration or hazard model (Karshenas and Stoneman 1995; Rose and Joskow 1990).
Kerr and Newell (2000) employed a duration model to analyze technology adoption decisions by petroleum
refineries during the phasedown of lead in gasoline, as discussed in Section 4.2.1 below.44
benefits from adoption and the initial adoption cost enter into decisions affecting the diffusion
rate.
46  In the probit model, this net present value comparison determines the location of the
adoption threshold that determines what fraction of potential adopters will adopt at a moment in
time.  In the epidemic model, this net present value comparison determines the magnitude of the
“contagiousness” parameter, which in turn determines the speed at which the technology spreads
from adopters to previous non-adopters.
Empirical studies have addressed the influence on diffusion of factors such as firm size,
R&D expenditure, market share, market structure, input prices, technology costs, firm
ownership, and other institutional factors.  The classic empirical study is by Griliches (1957),
who showed that the rate of adoption of hybrid corn seed in different regions depended on the
economic superiority of the new seed in that region.  David (1966) showed that the first adopters
of the mechanical reaper were larger farms, who benefited more from the decreased variable cost
it permitted.  Mansfield (1968) also found the rate of diffusion to depend on firm size (as do
most studies), as well as the riskiness of the new technology and the magnitude of the investment
required for adoption.
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4.1.1.  Increasing returns and technology lock-in
Increasing returns to adoption — in the form of learning curves and positive adoption
externalities — are a significant feature of market penetration processes for many technologies.
Learning-by-doing describes how cumulative production experience with a product leads to
                                                
46 The fact that technology costs enter into the adoption decision demonstrates the close link between technology
innovation and diffusion in both theory and reality. A key mechanism of diffusion is the gradual adoption of a new
technology as its cost falls (and/or quality improves). Such cost and quality improvements represent innovation.
Likewise, incentives for innovation will depend on the eventual demand for a new or improved product, that is,
diffusion.  This linkage also points to the difficulty of empirically distinguishing between technology innovation
and diffusion since they depend on one another and also both depend on similar external incentives such as
relative price changes.45
reduced production costs, while learning-by-using captures how the value of a good increases for
consumers as they gain experience using it.  Positive adoption externalities arise when a non-
user’s probability of adoption is increased the greater the number of potential users who have
already adopted (Berndt and Pindyck 2000).  This could occur because of fad or herding effects,
or because of “network externalities.”  Network externalities exist if a product is technologically
more valuable to an individual user as other users adopt a compatible product (for example,
telephone and computer networks).  These phenomena can be critical to understanding the
existing technological system, forecasting how that system might evolve, and predicting the
potential effect of some policy or event.
Furthermore, increasing returns to adopting a particular technology or system have been
linked with so-called technology “lock-in,” in which a particular product, technical standard,
production process, or service is produced by a market, and it is difficult to move to an
alternative competing technology.  Lock-in implies that, once led down a particular technological
path, the barriers to switching may be prohibitive.  This can be problematic if it would have been
in the broader social interest to adopt a fundamentally different pattern of technological capacity.
In turn, it raises the question of whether policy interventions — possibly involving central
coordination and information assessment, direct technology subsidies, or publicly funded
research, development, demonstration, and procurement programs — might avoid undesirable
cases of technology lock-in by guiding technological paths in directions superior to those that
would be taken by the free market.
A classic, although somewhat controversial, example given is the QWERTY keyboard
layout (David 1985).  As the story goes, the so-called Dvorak keyboard system is ergonomically
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more efficient than the standard layout.  In other words, we could all type faster and better if we
learned the Dvorak system.  Unfortunately, the QWERTY system got there first, so to speak, and
we may be stuck with it, due in part to network externalities and learning-by-doing.
Increasing returns are necessary but not sufficient conditions for persistent and
undesirable lock-in.  There must also be costs associated with maintaining parallel rival networks
or “switching costs” associated with moving between systems (for example, cost of buying a
new keyboard or learning to type on a new keyboard layout).  The presence of these factors,
however, in theory has the potential to lead to a market equilibrium in which a socially
suboptimal standard or technology is employed. Nonetheless, an inefficient outcome need not
necessarily result, and if it does it may not be lasting.  Market forces will eventually tend to
challenge the predominance of an inferior technology (see Ruttan 1997).
A related characteristic of products or systems subject to increasing returns or “positive
feedbacks” is that history can be critical. While other markets can often be explained by current
demand and supply, markets subject to increasing returns may not be fully understandable
without knowing the pattern of historical technology adoption.  Work by Arthur (1989, 1990,
1994), David (1985, 1997) and others (Foray 1997) on the importance of such “path
dependence” have focused on the lasting role that chance historical events can play in leading
market outcomes down one rather than another possible path. It is important to note that
increasing returns and technology lock-in do not necessarily imply market failure.  In cases
where they may, the question becomes what policies, markets, or institutions, if any, can
ameliorate undesirable technological paths or eventual lock-in.
We are far from having a well-established theoretical or empirical basis for when
intervention is preferable to an unregulated market outcome or the form that intervention should47
take.  (See Section 4.2.3 for applications to environmental and energy issues.)  David (1997, p
36) suggested that perhaps the most productive question to ask is “how can we identify situations
in which it is likely that at some future time individuals really would be better off had another
equilibria been selected” from the beginning.  One thing that public policy can do, David
suggested, is try to delay the market from irreversible commitments before enough information
has been obtained about the likely implications of an early, precedent-setting decision.
48 One
could construe current policy discussions surrounding certain biotechnology developments as
potentially doing just that.
Network Externalities.  Besen and Farrell (1994), Katz and Shapiro (1994), and
Liebowitz and Margolis (1994) together provide an overview of issues surrounding network
effects. Several properties of “network markets” distinguish them from other markets, influence
the strategies firms pursue, and may lead to market inefficiencies including oligopoly or
monopoly.  Network markets tend to tip; that is, the coexistence of incompatible products may
be unstable, resulting in a single standard dominating the market. Two potential inefficiencies
can also arise due to demand side coordination difficulties in the presence of network
externalities: excess inertia (users wait too long to adopt a new technology) or excess momentum
(users rush to an inferior technology to avoid being stranded) (see Farrell and Saloner 1985). The
role of information is central; the possibility of locking into an inferior technology is greater
when users have incomplete information, and it is expectations about the ultimate size of a
network that is crucial to which technology dominates.  The root problem is the difficulty of
collective coordination in a decentralized process (David 1997).
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One way to address this coordination problem is through standards — that is, a particular
technology chosen for universal adoption — which are often adopted by government or industry
associations when network externalities are present (telephone signals, for example).
49 While
standards may help avoid excess inertia and reduce users’ search and coordination costs, they
can also reduce diversity and may be subject to the strategy of a dominant firm.  Katz and
Shapiro (1994) point out that while network effects can lead to market inefficiencies, there are
many possible market responses to these problems that do not necessarily involve government
intervention.  Furthermore, there is a question about whether the government has the proper
incentives and information to improve the situation.
Learning-by-Doing and Learning-by-Using. In early production stages, the manufacture
of technologically complex products is fraught with difficulties.  As a firm produces more and
more of the product, however, it learns to produce it more efficiently and with higher levels of
quality.  Production experience leads to the rationalization of processes, reduced waste, and
greater labor force expertise.  When this is so, average production costs will tend to decrease
over time and with increases in the firm's cumulative output, albeit at a decreasing rate.
Alternative terms used to denote this characteristic learning pattern and related phenomena
include “learning curve”, “experience curve”, “learning-by-doing”, and “progress function.”
Learning-by-using, the demand-side counterpart of learning-by-doing, can complement and
reinforce these learning effects as adoption increases with greater experience in use and
increased productivity over time by the user (see Sunding and Zilberman 2000).
A technology with an initial cost advantage can allow for pricing that increases market
share.  In turn, increased market share can lead to even greater learning, cost reductions, and
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competitive advantage — a virtuous circle for the firms producing the technology.
Unfortunately, as with network effects, this persistent cost advantage can create a kind of entry
barrier if knowledge spillovers are incomplete.  In the extreme, the cost advantage may
completely deter or “lock out” the entry of new technologies or rival systems, at least for a time.
Spence (1981) showed that the main factors affecting costs and competition in the presence of
learning are the rate of learning, the extent of learning-induced cost decline relative to the
market, the intertemporal pattern of demand (that is, demand elasticity and growth), and the
degree of spillovers of learning to other firms.
50
4.2. Diffusion of green technology
While the induced innovation literature focuses on the potential for environmental policy
to bring forth new technology through innovation, there is also a widely-held view that
significant reductions in environmental impacts could be achieved through more widespread
diffusion of existing economically-attractive technologies, particularly ones that increase energy
efficiency and thereby reduce emissions associated with fossil fuel combustion. For example, the
report of the  Interlaboratory Working Group (1997) compiled a comprehensive analysis of
existing technologies that reportedly could reduce energy use and hence CO2 emissions at low or
even negative net cost to users.  The observation that energy-efficient technologies that are cost-
effective at current prices are diffusing only slowly dates back to the 1970s, having been
identified as a “paradox” at least as far back as Shama (1983).
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Yelle (1979), Dutton and Thomas (1984), Day and Montgomery (1983), and Argote and Epple (1990) together
provide an excellent overview of the fairly large empirical literature on learning curves, which spans the fields of
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As discussed in Section 4.1, above, the observation of apparently slow diffusion of
superior technology is not a surprise when viewed in historical context.  Nonetheless, the
apparent potential for emissions reductions associated with faster diffusion of existing
technology raises two important questions.  First, what is the theoretical and empirical potential
for “induced diffusion” of lower-emissions technologies? Specifically, how do environmental
policy instruments that implicitly or explicitly increase the economic incentive to reduce
emissions affect the diffusion rate of these technologies?
A second and related question is the degree to which historical diffusion rates have been
limited by market failures in the energy and equipment markets themselves (Jaffe and Stavins
1994).  To the extent that diffusion has been and is limited by market failures, it is less clear that
policies that operate by increasing the economic incentive to adopt such technology will be
effective.  On the other hand, if such market failures are important, then policies focused directly
on correction of such market failures provide, at least in principle, opportunities for policy
interventions that are social-welfare increasing, even without regard to any environmental
benefit. Table 3 summarizes the potential influence on technology diffusion of many of the
factors discussed in this section.
Table 3: Factors Influencing Technology Diffusion
Factor Likely Direction of Effect
on Technology Diffusion
Potential Policy/
Institutional Instrument
Increased relative price of resource
conserved by the technology
(+) tax on the resource
Decreased cost and/or increased quality
of technology
(+) technology subsidy
Inadequate information, uncertainty,
and agency problems regarding benefits
and costs of technology adoption
(-) information dissemination,
technology demonstration
Learning-by-doing and learning-by-
using
(+) technology demonstration and
deployment, tax/subsidy51
Network externalities (?) standards, planning,
coordination
Characteristics of potential adopters varied flexible regulation
4.2.1.  Effects of resource prices and technology costs
Kerr and Newell (2000) used a duration model to analyze the influence of plant
characteristics and the stringency and the form of regulation on technology adoption decisions by
petroleum refineries during the leaded gasoline phasedown.  They found that increased
stringency (which raised the effective price of lead) encouraged greater adoption of lead-
reducing technology. They also found that larger and more technically sophisticated refineries,
which had lower costs of adoption, were more likely to adopt the new technology.
Rose and Joskow (1990) found a positive effect of fuel price increases on the adoption of
a new fuel-saving technology in the U.S. electricity-generation sector, with the statistical
significance of the effect depending on the year of the fuel price.  In a tobit analysis of steel plant
adoption of different furnace technologies, Boyd and Karlson (1993) found a significant positive
effect of increases in a fuel’s price on the adoption of technology that saves that fuel, although
the magnitude of the effect was modest. For a sample of industrial plants in four heavily
polluting sectors (petroleum refining, plastics, pulp and paper, and steel), Pizer et al. (2001)
found that both energy prices and financial health were positively related to the adoption of
energy-saving technologies.
Jaffe and Stavins (1995) carried out econometric analyses of the factors affecting the
adoption of thermal insulation technologies in new residential construction in the United States
between 1979 and 1988.  They examined the dynamic effects of energy prices and technology52
adoption costs on average residential energy-efficiency technologies in new home construction.
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They found that the response of mean energy efficiency to energy price changes was positive and
significant, both statistically and economically.  Interestingly, they also found that equivalent
percentage adoption cost changes were about three times as effective as energy price changes in
encouraging adoption, although standard financial analysis would suggest they ought to be about
equal in percentage terms.  This finding offers confirmation for the conventional wisdom that
technology adoption decisions are more sensitive to up-front cost considerations than to longer-
term operating expenses.
Hassett and Metcalf (1995) found an even larger discrepancy between the effect of
changes in installation cost (here coming through tax credits) and changes in energy prices.
There are three interrelated possible explanations for this.  One possibility is a behavioral bias
that causes purchasers to focus more on up-front cost than they do on the lifetime operating costs
of an investment.  An alternative (but probably indistinguishable) view is that purchasers focus
equally on both, but uncertainty about future energy prices makes them give less weight to the
current energy price (which is only an indicator of future prices) than they do to the capital cost,
which is known.  A final interpretation might be that consumers actually have reasonably
accurate expectations about future energy prices, and their decisions reflect those expectations,
but our empirical proxies for their expectations are not correct.
For households and small firms, adoption of new technologies with significant capital
costs may be constrained by inadequate access to financing. And in some countries, import
                                                
51The effects of energy prices can be interpreted as suggesting what the likely effects of taxes on energy use would
be, and the effects of changes in adoption costs can be interpreted as indicating what the effects of technology
adoption subsidies would be.  See Section 4.3.2 of this chapter.53
barriers may inhibit the adoption of technology embodied in foreign-produced goods (Reppelin-
Hill 1999).
On the other hand, it must be acknowledged that it is impossible to generalize,
particularly across countries.  Nijkamp et al. (2001) presented the qualitative results of a survey
of Dutch firms regarding their decisions on how much to invest in energy-efficient technologies.
They found that general “barriers” to energy-efficient technology adoption – including the
existence of alternative investments, low energy costs, and a desire to replace capital only when
is fully depreciated – are more important than financial barriers and uncertainty about future
technologies and prices.
4.2.2.  Effects of inadequate information, agency problems, and uncertainty
As discussed in Section 4.1, above, information plays an important role in the technology
diffusion process.  There are two reasons why the importance of information may result in
market failure.  First, information is a public good that may be expected in general to be
underprovided by markets.  Second, to the extent that the adoption of the technology by some
users is itself an important mode of information transfer to other parties, adoption creates a
positive externality and is therefore likely to proceed at a socially suboptimal rate.
52  Howarth et
al. (2000) explored the significance of inadequate information in inhibiting the diffusion of more
efficient lighting equipment.  Metcalf and Hassett (1999) compared available estimates of energy
savings from new equipment to actual savings realized by users who have installed the
equipment.  They found that actual savings, while significant, were less than those promised by
                                                
52 Transfer of useful information via technology adoption is a special case of the more general phenomenon of
consumption externalities in technology adoption (Berndt and Pindyck 2000).  If early adopters act randomly
rather than on the basis of better information, then consumption externalities can result in socially excessive
adoption or “herding” effects.54
engineers and product manufacturers.  Their estimate of the median realized rate of return is
about 12%, which they found to be close to a discount rate for this investment implied by a
CAPM analysis.
Also related to imperfect information are a variety of agency problems that can inhibit the
adoption of superior technology.  The agency problem can be either external or internal to
organizations.  An example of an external agency problem would be a landlord/tenant
relationship, in which a tenant pays for utilities but the landlord makes decisions regarding which
appliances to purchase, or vice versa.  Internal agency problems can arise in organizations where
the individual or department responsible for equipment purchase or maintenance differs from the
individual or department whose budget covers utility costs.
53  DeCanio (1998) explored the
significance of organizational factors in explaining firms’ perceived returns to installation of
energy-efficient lighting.
54
Uncertainty is another factor that may limit the adoption of new technology (Geroski
2000).  Such uncertainty is not a market failure, merely a fact of economic life.  Uncertainty can
be inherent in the technology itself, in the sense that its newness means that users are not sure
how it will be perform (Mansfield 1968).  For resource-saving technology, there is the additional
uncertainty that the economic value of such savings depends on future resource prices, which are
themselves uncertain.  This uncertainty about future returns means that there is an “option value”
                                                
53 For a discussion of the implications of the separation of environmental decision-making in major firms from
relevant economic signals, see:  Hockenstein et al., (1997).  A series of related case studies are provided by
Reinhardt (2000).
54 Agency problems are probably part of the basis for the hypothesis that energy-saving investments are ignored
simply because energy is too small a fraction of overall costs to justify management attention and decisionmaking.
This idea actually dates back to Alfred Marshall; one of his four laws of demand was “the importance of being
unimportant.”  Marshall (1922) argued that inputs with small factor shares would receive little attention from firms
and hence face inelastic factor demand curves.55
associated with postponing the adoption of new technology (Pindyck 1991; Hassett and Metcalf
1995, 1996).
Closely related to the issue of uncertainty is the issue of the discount rate or investment
hurdle rate used by purchasers in evaluating the desirability of new technology, particularly
resource-conserving technology.  A large body of research demonstrates that purchasers appear
to use relatively high discount rates in evaluating energy-efficiency investments (Hausman 1979;
Ruderman et al. 1987; Ross 1990).  The implicit or explicit use of relatively high discount rates
for energy savings does not represent a market failure in itself; it is rather the manifestation of
underlying aspects of the decision process including those just discussed.  At least some portion
of the discount rate premium is likely to be related to uncertainty, although the extent to which
the premium can be explained by uncertainty and option value is subject to debate (Hassett and
Metcalf 1995, 1996; Sanstad et al. 1995).
55  Capital market failures that make it difficult to
secure external financing for these investments may also play a role.
56
4.2.3.  Effects of Increasing Returns
As described in Section 4.1, above, the presence of increasing returns in the form of
learning effects, network externalities, or other positive adoption externalities presents the
possibility that market outcomes for technologies exhibiting these features, including those with
environmental consequences, may be inefficient.  For example, the idea that we are “locked into”
a fossil-fuel-based energy system is a recurring theme in policy discussions regarding climate
change and other energy-related environmental problems.  At a more aggregate level, there has
                                                
55 Option values can arise for investments that can be postponed, and unless explicit account is taken of the option
value, it will result in an increased effective hurdle rate for the investment.
56 Shrestha and Karmacharya (1998) carried out an empirical analysis of the relative importance of various potential
barriers to the adoption of fluorescent lighting in Nepal.  They found that product information predicted adoption,
but owner-occupancy and discount rates did not.56
been much discussion of the question of whether it is possible for developing countries to take
less environmentally-damaging paths of development than have currently industrialized
countries, for example by relying less on fossil fuels.
57
While the empirical literature is quite thin, some studies have explored the issue of
increasing returns and technology lock-in for competing technologies within the energy and
environment arenas, including analysis of renewable energy and fossil fuels (Cowan and Kline
1996), the internal combustion engine and alternatively-fueled vehicles (Cowan and  Hulten
1996), pesticides and integrated pest management (Cowan and Gunby 1996), technologies for
electricity generation ( Islas 1997), nuclear power reactor designs (Cowan 1990), and the
transition from hydrocarbon-based fuels (Kemp 1997).
Energy and environment-related examples of empirical estimation of learning curves
include work related to renewable energy and climate modeling (Nakicenovic 1996; Neij 1997;
Grübler and Messner 1999; Grübler et al. 1999), nuclear reactors (Joskow and Rozanski 1979;
Zimmerman 1982; Lester and McCabe 1993), and electricity supply (Sharp and Price 1990).
Although network externalities can be an important element of increasing returns, especially for
information and communication technologies, their role in environmental technologies is less
evident.
4.3.  Effects of instrument choice on diffusion
4.3.1.  Theoretical Analyses
The predominant theoretical framework for analyses of diffusion effects has been what
could be called the “discrete technology choice” model:  firms contemplate the use of a certain
                                                
57 See the survey by Evenson (1995) on technology and development. Also see the chapter in this volume on
“Environment and Development” for a discussion of related issues, including the “environmental Kuznets curve.”57
technology which reduces marginal costs of pollution abatement and which has a known fixed
cost associated with it.  While some authors have presented this approach as a model of
“innovation,”
58 it is more appropriately viewed as a model of adoption.
With such models, several theoretical studies have found that the incentive for the
adoption of new technologies is greater under market-based instruments than under direct
regulation (Zerbe 1970;
59 Downing and White 1986; Milliman and Prince 1989; Jung  et al.
1996).  With the exception of Downing and White (1986), all of these studies examined the gross
impacts of alternative policy instruments on the quantity of technology adoption.
60
Theoretical comparisons among market-based instruments have produced only limited
agreement. In a frequently-cited article, Milliman and Prince (1989) examined firm-level
incentives for technology diffusion provided by five instruments:  command-and-control;
emission taxes; abatement subsidies; freely-allocated emission permits, and auctioned emission
permits.  Firm-level incentives for adoption in this representative-firm model were pictured as
the consequent change in producer surplus.  They found that auctioned permits would provide
the largest adoption incentive of any instrument, with emissions taxes and subsidies second, and
freely allocated permits and direct controls last. The Milliman and Prince (1989) study was
criticized by Marin (1991) because of its assumption of identical firms, but it was subsequently
                                                
58Downing and White (1986) and Malueg (1989) framed their work in terms of “innovation.”  Milliman and Prince
(1989) used one model to discuss both diffusion and “innovation,” the latter being defined essentially as the initial
use of the technology by an “innovating” firm.
59Zerbe (1970) compared taxes, subsidies, and direct regulation (emissions standards).  If a technology reduces
emissions levels, rather than costs, taxes are still superior to direct regulation, but subsidies are not.
60Downing and White (1986) compared market-based instruments and command-and-control standards, and found
for the case of small changes in emissions (so that the optimal pollution tax or permit quantity is unchanged) that
all of the instruments except CAC standards would induce the socially optimal level of adoption.  But for non-
marginal emission changes, where the control authority does not modify the policy (tax or quantity of available
permits), market-based instruments would induce too much diffusion, relative to the social optimum.  Keohane
(2001) demonstrated that the cost savings from adoption will always be greater under a market-based instrument
than under an emissions rate standard that induces the same emissions.58
shown that the results remain largely unchanged with heterogeneous abatement costs  (Milliman
and Prince 1992).
In 1996, Jung et al. built on Milliman and Prince's basic framework for comparing the
effects of alternative policy instruments, but rather than focusing on firm-level changes in
producer surplus, they considered heterogeneous firms, and modeled the “market-level
incentive” created by various instruments.
61  Their rankings echoed those of Milliman and Prince
(1989):  auctioned permits provided the greatest incentive, followed by taxes and subsidies, free
permits, and performance standards.
Subsequent theoretical analyses (Parry 1998;  Denicolò 1999; Keohane 1999) clarified
several aspects of these rankings.  First,  there is the question of relative firm-level incentives to
adopt a new, cost-saving technology when the price of pollution (permit price or tax level) is
endogenous.  Milliman and Prince (1989), as well as Jung et al. (1996), argued that auctioned
permits would provide greater incentives for diffusion than freely-allocated permits, because
technology diffusion lowers the equilibrium permit price, bringing greater aggregate benefits of
adoption in a regime where all sources are permit buyers (that is, auctions).  But when
technology diffusion lowers the market price for tradeable permits, all firms benefit from this
lower price regardless of whether or not they adopt the given technology (Keohane 1999).  Thus,
if firms are price takers in the permit market, auctioned permits provide no more adoption
incentive than freely-allocated permits.
The overall result is that both auctioned and freely-allocated permits are inferior in their
diffusion incentives to emission tax systems (but superior to command-and-control instruments).
Under tradeable permits, technology diffusion lowers the equilibrium permit price, thereby
                                                
61This measure is simply the aggregate cost savings to the industry as a whole from adopting the technology.59
reducing the incentive for participating firms to adopt.  Thus, a permit system provides a lower
adoption incentive than a tax, assuming the two instruments are equivalent before diffusion
occurs (Denicolò 1999; Keohane 1999).
62
More broadly, it appears that an unambiguous exhaustive ranking of instruments is not
possible on the basis of theory alone.  Parry (1998) found that the welfare gain induced by an
emissions tax is significantly greater than that induced by tradable permits only in the case of
very major innovations.  Similarly, Requate (1998) included an explicit model of the final output
market, and finds that whether (auctioned) permits or taxes provide stronger incentives to adopt
an improved technology depends upon empirical values of relevant parameters.
63
Furthermore, complete theoretical analysis of the effects of alternative policy instruments
on the rate of technological change must include modeling of the government’s response to
technological change, because the degree to which regulators respond to technologically-induced
changes in abatement costs affects the magnitude of the adoption incentive associated with
alternative policy instruments.
64  Because technology diffusion presumably lowers the aggregate
marginal abatement cost function, it results in a change in the efficient level of control.  Hence,
following diffusion, the optimal agency response is to set a more ambitious target.  Milliman and
Prince (1989) examined the incentives facing private industry, under alternative policy
instruments, to oppose such policy changes.  Their conclusion was that firms would oppose
optimal agency adjustment of the policy under all instruments except taxes.  Under an emissions
                                                
62The difference between diffusion incentives of permits and taxes/subsidies depends upon four conditions:  (1)
some diffusion occurs; (2) firms have rational expectations and recognize that diffusion lowers the permit price;
(3) taxes and permits are equivalent ex ante; and (4) the level of regulation is fixed over the time horizon
considered.
63 See, also:  Parry (1995).
64 See our discussion, above, of “Induced Innovation and Optimal Environmental Policy” in Section 3.3.60
tax, the optimal agency response to cost-reducing technological change is to lower the tax rate
(assuming convex damages); under a subsidy, the optimal response is to lower the subsidy; under
tradeable permit systems, the optimal response is to decrease the number of available permits,
and thereby drive up the permit price.  Thus, firms have clear incentives to support the optimal
agency response only under an emissions tax regime.
In a comparison of tradeable permits and pollution taxes, Biglaiser et al. (1995) examined
these instruments’ ability to achieve the first-best outcome in a dynamic setting.
65  They found
that effluent taxes can do so, but permits cannot.  With an effluent tax, the optimal tax is
presumably determined by marginal damages (which the authors assume to be constant),
yielding a policy which is time consistent.  Whether or not firms adopt a cost-saving technology,
the government has no incentive to change the tax rate.  From this perspective, however,
tradeable permits are not time consistent, because the optimal number of permits in each period
depends on both firms’ costs, which are determined by all previous investments, and marginal
damages.  With constant marginal damages, and marginal abatement costs decreasing over time,
the optimal number of permits should also be decreasing over time.  Firms may internalize this,
and thereby invest less than optimally in pollution control technology.
The result of Biglaiser et al. (1995) depends, however, on the assumption of constant
marginal damages.  If marginal damages are not constant, then the optimal policy is determined
by the interaction of marginal damages and marginal abatement costs for both taxes and permits.
The result appears to be analogous to Weitzman's (1974) rule:  if the marginal damage curve is
relatively flat and there is uncertainty in marginal costs (from the regulator's perspective) due to
potential innovation at the firm level, then a price instrument is more efficient.
                                                
65 See, also, Biglaiser and Horowtiz (1995).61
4.3.2.  Empirical Analyses
Unlike the case of empirical analysis of the effects of alternative policy instruments on
technology innovation (Section 3.2.3, above), where nearly all of the analysis focuses on energy-
efficiency technologies, in the case of technology diffusion, there is a small, but significant
literature of empirical analyses focused on pollution-abatement technologies per se.
One of the great successes during the modern era of environmental policy was the
phasedown of lead in gasoline, which took place in the United States principally during the
decade of the 1980's.  The phasedown was accomplished through a tradeable permit system
among refineries, whereby lead rights could be exchanged and/or banked for later use.
66  As
noted in Section 4.2.1, Kerr and Newell (2000) used a duration model to assess the effects of the
phasedown program on technology diffusion.  As theory suggests (Malueg 1989), they found
that the tradeable permit system provided incentives for more  efficient technology adoption
decisions, as evidenced by a significant divergence in the adoption behavior of refineries with
low versus high compliance costs. Namely, the positive differential in the adoption propensity of
expected permit sellers (i.e., low-cost refineries) relative to expected permit buyers (i.e., high-
cost refineries) was significantly greater under market-based lead regulation compared to under
individually binding performance standards.
Another prominent application of tradeable permit systems which has provided an
opportunity for empirical analysis of the effects of policy instruments on technology diffusion is
the sulfur dioxide allowance trading program, initiated under the U.S. Clean Air Act
amendments of 1990.  In an econometric analysis, Keohane (2001) found evidence of the way in
which the increased flexibility of a market-based instrument can provide greater incentives for
technology adoption.  In particular, he found that the choice of whether or not to adopt a
“scrubber” to remove sulfur dioxide — rather than purchasing (more costly) low-sulfur coal —
                                                
66The tradeable permit system was also a great success.  See the chapter on “Experience with Market-Based
Instruments for Environmental Protection” in this volume.62
was more sensitive to cost differences (between scrubbing and fuel-switching) under the
tradeable permit system than under the earlier emissions rate standard.
67
In an examination of the effects of alternative policy instruments for reducing oxygen-
demanding water pollutants, Kemp (1998) found that effluent charges were a significant
predictor of adoption of biological treatment by facilities.  In earlier work, Purvis and Outlaw
(1995) carried out a case study of EPA’s permitting process for acceptable water-pollution
control technologies in the U.S. livestock  production sector.  Those authors concluded that the
relevant regulations encouraged the use of “time-tested” technologies that provided lower levels
of environmental protection than other more innovative ones, simply because producers knew
that EPA was more likely to approve a permit that employed the established approach.
Another body of research has examined the effects on technology diffusion of command-
and-control environmental standards when they are combined with “differential environmental
regulations.”  In many situations where command-and-control standards have been used, the
required level of pollution abatement has been set at a far more stringent level for new sources
than for existing ones.
68  There is empirical evidence that such differential environmental
regulations have lengthened the time before plants were retired (Maloney and Brady 1988;
Nelson et al. 1993).  Further, this dual system can actually worsen pollution by encouraging
firms to keep older, dirtier plants in operation (Stewart 1981; Gollop and Roberts 1983;
McCubbins et al. 1989).
In addition to economic incentives, direct regulation, and information provision, some
research has emphasized the role that “informal regulation” or community pressure can play in
encouraging the adoption of environmentally clean technologies.  For example, in an analysis of
                                                
67Several additional research efforts on the sulfur dioxide allowance trading program are underway; a number of
relevant hypotheses are described by Stavins (1998).
68It could be argued that new plants ought to have somewhat more stringent standards if their abatement costs are
lower, although such standards should obviously be linked with actual abatement costs, not with the proxy of plant
vintage.63
fuel adoption decisions for traditional brick kilns in Mexico, Blackman and Bannister (1998)
suggested that community pressure applied by competing firms and local non-governmental
organizations was associated with increased adoption of cleaner fuels, even when those fuels had
relatively high variable costs.
Turning from pollution abatement to energy efficiency, the analysis by Jaffe and Stavins
(1995), described above in Section 4.2.1, provided evidence of the likely effects of energy taxes
and technology adoption subsidies on the adoption of thermal insulation technologies in new
residential construction in the United States.  Their findings suggest the response to energy taxes
would be positive and significant, and that equivalent percentage technology cost subsidies
would be about three times as effective as taxes in encouraging adoption, although standard
financial analysis would suggest they ought to be about equal in percentage terms. These results
were corroborated by the study of residential energy conservation investments by Hassett and
Metcalf (1995), also described in Section 4.2.1, which suggested that tax credits for adoption
would be up to eight times more effective than “equivalent” energy taxes.
Although empirical evidence from these two studies indicate that subsidies may be more
effective than “equivalent” taxes in encouraging technology diffusion, it is important to
recognize some disadvantages of such subsidy approaches.  First, unlike energy prices, (energy-
efficiency) adoption subsidies do not provide incentives to reduce utilization.  Second,
technology subsidies and tax credits can require large public expenditures per unit of effect,
since consumers who would have purchased the product even in the absence of the subsidy still
receive it.   In the presence of fiscal constraints on public spending, this raises questions about
the feasibility of subsidies that would be sizable enough to have desired effects.
69
                                                
69Mountain et al. (1989) attempted to assess the effects of relative prices on relevant technology diffusion in the
Ontario manufacturing sector from 1962 to 1984.  They found that fuel choices changed in response to changes in
fuel prices, but given the nature of their analysis, they could not distinguish between product substitution and
technology diffusion.64
What about conventional command-and-control approaches?  Jaffe and Stavins (1995)
also examined the effects of more conventional regulations on technology diffusion, in the form
of state building codes.  They found no discernable effects.  It is unclear to what extent this is
due to inability to measure the true variation across states in the effectiveness of codes, or to
codes that were in many cases not binding relative to typical practice. This is a reminder,
however, that although price-based policies will always have some effect, typical command-and-
control may have little effect if they are set below existing standards of practice.
In a separate analysis of thermal home insulation, this one in the Netherlands, Kemp
(1997) found that a threshold model of diffusion (based on a rational choice approach) could not
explain observed diffusion patterns.  Instead, epidemic models provided a better fit to the data.
Kemp also found that there was no significant effect of government subsidies on the adoption of
thermal insulation by households.
Attention has also been given to the effects on energy-efficiency technology diffusion of
voluntary environmental programs.  Howarth et al. (2000) examined two voluntary programs of
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the Green Lights and Energy Star programs, both of
which are intended to encourage greater private industry use of energy-saving technologies.  A
natural question from economics is why would firms carry out  additional technology
investments as part of a voluntary agreement?  The authors respond that there are a set of agency
problems that inhibit economically wise adoption of some technologies (see discussion of these
issues in Section 4.2.2). For example, most energy-saving investments are small, and senior staff
may rationally choose to restrict funds for small projects that cannot be perfectly monitored.  The
Green Lights program may be said to attempt to address this type of agency problem by
providing information on savings opportunities at the level of the firm where decisions are
made.
70
                                                
70Another potential explanation arises where the benefits and costs of a project are born by different units of a firm.
Under such circumstances, projects that are good for the firm may not be undertaken.  See discussion of this
phenomenon in the chapter on “Experience with Market-Based Instruments for Environmental Protection.”65
Although the empirical literature on the effects of policy instruments on technology
diffusion by no means settles all of the issues that emerge from the related theoretical studies, a
consistent theme that runs through both the pollution-abatement and energy-efficiency empirical
analyses is that market-based instruments are decidedly more effective than command-and-
control instruments in encouraging the cost-effective adoption and diffusion of relevant new
technologies.
5.  Conclusion
In opening this chapter, we suggested that an understanding of the process of
technological change is important for economic analysis of environmental issues for two broad
reasons.  First, the environmental impact of social and economic activity is greatly affected by
the rate and direction of technological change.  This linkage occurs because new technologies
may either create or mitigate pollution, and because many environmental problems and policy
responses are evaluated over timeframes in which the cumulative impact of technological
changes is likely to be large.
The importance of the first link is manifest in determining the economic and
environmental “baseline” against which to measure the impacts of proposed policies.  That is,
before we can discuss what we should or should not do about some environmental problem, we
need to forecast how severe the problem will be in the absence of any action.  Such forecasts are
always based, in some way, on extrapolation of historical experience.  Within that historical
experience, the processes of technological change have been operating, often with significant
consequences for the severity of environmental impacts.  Forecasts for the future based on this
historical experience depend profoundly on the relative magnitude of the effects of price-induced
technological change, learning-by-doing and learning-by-using, public sector R&D, and66
exogenous technical progress.  Sorting out these influences with respect to environmentally
relevant technologies and sectors poses a major modeling and empirical challenge.
A particularly important aspect of this set of issues is the historical significance of “lock-
in” phenomena for environmentally significant technologies.  We understand the theory of
increasing returns and other sources of path dependence, but we have little evidence regarding
their quantitative importance.  We know that it is theoretically possible, for example, that the
dominant place of the internal combustion engine in our economy results from a combination of
historical accidents and path dependence.  But the actual magnitude of such effects, relative to
the role played by the superior attractiveness of the technology to individual users, has enormous
consequences for the question of whether developing nations will be able or likely to find a
different path.
Another important area is in the conceptual and empirical modeling of how the various
stages of technological change are interrelated, how they unfold over time, and the differential
impact that various policies (for example, public-sector R&D, R&D subsidies to the private
sector, environmental taxes, information programs) may have on each phase of technological
change.  We have reviewed the existing literature on various aspects of technology policy, but
there has been relatively little empirical analysis of these policy options directed specifically at
the development of environmentally beneficial technology.
There has been much debate surrounding the “win-win” hypothesis.  Much of this debate
has been explicitly or implicitly ideological or political.  More useful would be detailed
examinations regarding the kinds of policies and the kinds of private-sector institutions that are
most likely to generate innovative, low-cost solutions to environmental problems.67
This observation is a natural bridge to the second broad linkage between technology and
environment, the effect of environmental policy interventions on the process of technological
change.  The empirical evidence to date is generally consistent with theoretical findings that
market-based instruments for environmental protection are likely to have significantly greater,
positive impacts over time than command-and-control approaches on the invention, innovation,
and diffusion of desirable, environmentally-friendly technologies.  Further, empirical studies
suggest that the response of technological change to relevant price changes can be surprisingly
swift in terms of patenting activity and introduction of new model offerings—on the order of five
years or less.  Substantial diffusion can sometimes take considerably longer, depending on the
rate of retirement of previously installed equipment.  The longevity of much equipment
reinforces the importance of taking a longer-term view toward improvements — on the order of
decades.  Existing empirical studies have also produced some results that may not be consistent
with theoretical expectations, such as the finding from two independent analyses that the
diffusion of energy-efficiency technologies is more sensitive to variation in adoption-cost than to
commensurate energy price changes.  Further theoretical and/or empirical work may resolve this
apparent anomaly.
A variety of refutable hypotheses that emerge from theoretical models of alternative
instruments have not been tested rigorously with empirical data.  For example, the predictions
from theory regarding the ranking of alternative environmental policy instruments is quite clear,
but much of the empirical analysis has focused on energy-efficient technologies, rather than
pollution abatement technologies per se.  The increased use of market-based instruments and
performance-based standards has brought with it considerably more data with which hypotheses
regarding the effects of policy instruments on technology innovation and diffusion can be tested.68
The potential long-run consequences of today’s policy choices create a high priority for
broadening and deepening our understanding of the effects of environmental policy on
innovation and diffusion of new technology.  Unfortunately, these issues cannot be resolved at a
purely theoretical level, or on the basis of aggregate empirical analyses.  For both benefit-cost
and cost-effectiveness analysis, we need to know the magnitudes of these effects, and these
magnitudes are likely to differ across markets, technologies, and institutional settings.  Thus,
taking seriously the notion of induced technological change and its consequences for
environmental policy requires going beyond demonstration studies that test whether or not such
effects exist, to carry out detailed analyses in a variety of sectors in order to understand the
circumstances under which they are large or small.  This will require significant research
attention from multiple methodological viewpoints over an extended period of time.  But the
alternative is continuing to formulate public policies with significant economic and
environmental consequences without being able to take into account what is going on “inside the
black box” of technological change.69
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